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Abstract 
The complex and elusive structure we call ‘Europe’ is the result of multiple cultural, economic, social 
and political conditions under which Law, and in particular the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU), is performing a unique integrating role. The juridification of the European 
policy process is increasingly fragile, and little understood. This study extends a novel methodology 
developed in our previous work (MLR 2016) that revealed the workings of the Court through empirical 
analysis of the disciplinary background of judges and topoi engaged in their reasoning. Our new study 
turns the attention to  the influence of Member States on the rulings of the Court. We focus again on 
the domain of copyright law in which we have seen a dramatic escalation of preliminary references to 
the Court, suggesting a normative void. Examining 170 documents relating to 42 cases registered 
between 1998 and 2015, we measure empirically the impact of submissions by Member States and 
the European Commission on the legal interpretation of copyright concepts. 
The findings show that France is the most influential country by some distance, both in terms of the 
number of interventions (an ‘investment’ in policy) and in terms of persuasive power (France’s 
arguments – 69% in favour of rightholders – are more often adopted by the Court than any other 
country’s). Surprisingly, three smaller countries are in the next group of strong influencers: Finland  
(slightly skewed pro-rightholders), Portugal (strongly user friendly) and Czech Republic (moderately 
rightholder friendly). Other countries appear to have very specific interests, intervening less often and 
in a targeted manner. They may be influential despite lower participation. One of the most effective 
governments arguing for the interests of copyright users is the United Kingdom. Our evidence 
suggests that the departure of the UK from EU litigation has the potential to disturb the delicate 
balance of European copyright jurisprudence. 
Keywords: CJEU; Copyright; Litigation; European Integration; Brexit 
1. Introduction 
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) plays a role quite unlike any other 
international court in what has been called “a notable juridification of the European policy 
process”1. In a time of potential disintegration, it has become more important than ever to 
understand how the Court performs its integrating role in a contested political environment. 
                                                                 
* Marcella Favale is Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Intellectual Property Pol icy and Management (CIPPM), Bournemouth 
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supported by CREATe, AHRC Grant Number AH/K000179/1 and by Kretschmer’s Fernand Braudel fellowship at the 
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Mr Ignace Maselis; The Court Registry; Academics Marie-Pierre Granger, Andreas Moberg, Jeff Carrubba; Agents and Civil 
Servants from a ll 16 Member States that made copyright submissions in the 42 cases coded; the European Commission 
(fol lowing a request under Regulation 1049/2001).  
1 Dehousse, The European Court of Justice: The Politics of Judicial Integration (Macmillan, 1998), 177. 
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This requires an analysis that does not rely on the assumption of legal autonomy. We need 
to understand the forces that shape the behaviour of the Court of Justice beyond an analysis 
of the case law and the Court’s evolving jurisprudence. 
Political science treats the possibility of autonomous action of the Court with scepticism, 
often suggesting that the Court’s rulings are determined by the anticipated reactions of 
national governments 2. In this study, we develop an empirical approach that uses the 
window of Member States’ written observations to investigate the influence of governments 
on the jurisprudence of the Court in one specific subject domain: copyright law. 
In her pioneering research on the behaviour of Governments before the Court, Marie-Pierre 
Granger3 argues that carrying out a study to measure the impact of Governments’ written 
observations was not feasible. It is certainly true that since written observations are 
‘confidential’, and are no longer published in the Court proceedings, this task can appear 
daunting. However, in order to make a significant advance in understanding the role of 
national governments in relation to the Court of Justice, these obstacles need to be 
overcome.   
Our core research question was initially anchored in the fast moving domain of copyright law 
because the CJEU seemed to fill a normative void, with a dramatic escalation of cases.4 We 
were concerned with the possibility that the jurisprudence of the Court was open to capture, 
and that national governments may be able to steer the Court to produce policy outcomes 
that were politically unachievable. 
Even though there are certain limitations to capturing all Governments’ written observations 
verbatim, we show that it is possible to assemble sufficient data to establish trends and 
construct a number of possible scenarios. With the assistance of supportive Agents before 
the Court, the Court Registry, and Freedom of Information requests (both under Regulation 
1049/2001 and national legislation), we have been able to produce a near comprehensive 
database of interventions and outcomes in 42 copyright cases before the Court of Justice. 
This allows a considerable advance in our knowledge (both methodologically and in 
substance) about the functioning of jurisprudence in the complex and elusive structure we 
call ‘Europe’. For the first time, it is possible to see how Member States and the Commission 
are pushing the Court in a specific subject domain. Drawing on this picture, we can also 
simulate different scenarios prompted by Europe’s unique geopolitical context, including the 
departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union. 
                                                                 
2 Carrubba, Gabel and Hankla, “Judicial Behavior under Political Constraints: Evidence from the European Court of Justice” 
102(4) Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. (2008) 435–52. 
3 Granger, “When governments go to Luxembourg . . . the influence of governments on the Court of Justice” 39 E.L.Rev. 
(2004) 1-31, at 1. See a lso generally Granger, “Les s tratégies contentieuses des Etats devant la Cour” in Mbongo and 
Vauchez (eds), Dans la fabrique du droit européen (Bruylant, 2009 Bruxelles). 
4 Prel iminary references increased from 6 copyright cases filed in the 10 years following the Phil Collins case (C-92/92), 6 
cases in the 5 years between 2002 and 2006,  21 cases in the 5 years between 2007 and 2011, to 43 cases between 2012-
15. 
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The research underpinning this study is our previous work on the Court of Justice.5 Our 
earlier study investigated empirically two frequently made claims: (i) that the Court failed to 
develop a coherent copyright jurisprudence (lacking domain expertise, copyright specific 
reasoning, and predictability); (ii) that the Court pursued an activist, harmonising agenda 
(resorting to teleological interpretation of European law). We analysed the allocation of 
copyright and database right cases by Chambers of the Court, Advocate General (AG) and 
Reporting Judge, and investigated the biographical background of the Judges and AGs sitting. 
We also traced patterns of reasoning in the Court’s approach through quantitative content 
analysis. We identified the legal topoi that were employed in the opinions and decisions, and 
then linked the occurrence of these topoi to the outcome of each case. The results showed 
that private law, and in particular intellectual property law expertise was almost entirely 
missing from the Court. However, we found that the Court had developed a mechanism for 
enabling judicial learning through the systematic assignment of cases to certain Judges and 
AGs.  We also found that the Court had developed a ‘fair balance’ topos linked to Judge 
Malenovský (rapporteur on 24 out of then 40 copyright cases 1992-2012) that did not 
predict an agenda of upward harmonisation, with about half of judgments narrowing rather 
than widening the scope of copyright protection.  
Our earlier study tried to lift the lid on how the CJEU works as a social body making copyright 
law. The focus of this new research moves from the judiciary to the role of governments in 
shaping the copyright jurisprudence of the Court. 
There are considerable resources available from the political science literature how to 
approach this question. In particular, empirical socio-legal research has suggested that while 
various organisations can use strategic litigation (preliminary references) to steer judicial 
policy6, Member States can use their intervention via written observations for the same 
purpose7. According to some research, governments use participation in litigation to try to 
obtain favourable decisions 8 because they understand that they can influence EU 
jurisprudence through well-written and well-argued observations 9. A fortiori, governments 
have realised that with successful interventions before the Court they can obtain the 
reversal of European policies that they opposed without success in the EU Council.10 
However, other empirical research has suggested that the European judiciary is constrained 
                                                                 
5 Fava le, Kretschmer, Torremans, “Is there a  EU Copyright Jurisprudence? An empirical analysis of the workings of the 
European Court of Justice” 79(1) MLR (2016) 31-75. 
6 Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice (Martinus Nijoff, 1986) at 270. 
7 See Granger 2004, supra note 3, at 1. 
8 Wei ler, “The Transformation of Europe” (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 2403. 
9 Col l ins, “Representation of a  Member State before the Court of Justice of the European Communities: practice in the 
United Kingdom” 27 E.L.Rev. (2002) 359. 
10 Granger, 2004, supra note 3 at 9. 
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in its rulings by fear of overturning or disapplication from the referring Member State, and it 
acts accordingly.11 
While the present study focusses on copyright case law, its methodological approach can be 
applied to any area of law before the CJEU. Indeed, the systematic analysis of briefs and 
submissions before a court is a promising and fast developing field of enquiry, opening a 
new perspective on the workings of any judiciary. 
After a brief overview of the copyright literature discussing the normative role of the CJEU 
and the way it addresses recurrent litigation on particularly controversial topics, the article 
empirically analyses the Court’s copyright jurisprudence, to provide measurable answers to a 
number of instrumental sub-questions: 
1. What are the most contested legal concepts in EU Copyright Law? 
2. Who are the Governments interested in shaping copyright jurisprudence and, 
specifically, on which legal concepts are they intervening? 
3. What interests are Governments supporting (e.g. rightholders’ or users’)? 
4. To what extent are Governments successful in steering the Court towards their 
interpretation of legal concepts? 
 
The article proceeds as follows. Having set the context (Section 1), our methodological 
approach will be explained and justified (Section 2). Section 3 will provide the conceptual 
framework for analysing the normative role of the Court, using the example of the concept 
of ‘communication to the public’ to illustrate the implications. Section 4 will identify the legal 
concepts that recur most frequently in copyright litigation; this we assume is outlining a 
normative void. Section 5 identifies the countries that are most active in copyright litigation. 
Section 6 presents and discusses our central empirical findings, quantifying the influence of 
each country before the Court and their relative position in favour of rightholders or users. 
Finally, Section 7 offers a conclusion, interpreting the findings for the ‘production of Europe’. 
2. Methodology 
 
This article extends methods used in our previous work and in previous social science 
research. Marie-Pierre Granger12 was first to study the litigation strategies of Governments 
intending to have an impact on the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice. Her dataset 
includes the number of governments’ written observations, the areas of intervention, and 
the number of interventions in preliminary references filed by a court of the same 
government in the years between 1995 and 1999. She used qualitative methods including 
structured questionnaires and interviews of Agents acting for Governments. 
                                                                 
11 See Carrubba et al. supra note 2 at 9. On the same topic of the impact on ECJ decisions of possible Member States non-
compl iance see a lso Garrett, Kelemen, and Schulz, “The European Court of Justice, National Governments, and Legal 
Integration in the European Union”  52(1) International Organization (1998) 149-176.  
12 Granger, 2004, supra note 3. 
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Carrubba measured the impact of governments’ observations on ECJ rulings involving the 
government as a litigator. In particular, the work measured how the threat of non-
compliance (in national courts) or overriding (in the Council) influences the Court’s decisions. 
To this end, he employed text analysis (coding) of legal documents (cases between 1987 and 
1997) and statistical analysis, including regression modelling of binary response variables 
(probit model). The document analysis involved coding the ruling and the written 
observations by capturing the preference of the government on each individual legal issue.13  
Cramér and colleagues 14 also use content analysis (coding) of governments’ written 
observations and preliminary reports 15 before the CJEU between 1997 and 2008, and 
descriptive statistics. Unlike other research16 they also break down the observations into 
legal arguments. The most interesting finding of their work is that the litigation behaviour of 
Member States is consistent with their government’s economic model and therefore with 
their mainstream policies. Cramér et al.’s research also codes the relative position of 
countries as ‘pro EU Integration’ or ‘pro National Sovereignty’.17   
In our study, we use content analysis of documents (coding), a structured questionnaire 
recording Government’s suggested answers (followed by unstructured feedback from agents 
and civil servants on our preliminary findings) and basic statistical computation of the data. 
The research design progressed in the following steps: 
First, doctrinal analysis was used to identify groups of preliminary references demanding 
clarifications from the Court on the same copyright concept (for example, ‘communication to 
the public’). The dataset, consisting of all 78 copyright cases registered between 1998 and 
2015 (and concluded before the Court) was clustered on the basis of the main legal concept 
examined by each preliminary reference. The results show that more than half of all 
preliminary copyright references were filed on only five concepts, which therefore received 
more attention from the CJEU, indicating a potentially contested policy direction. 
Secondly, the study employed content analysis (expert coding) on these 42 selected cases 
dealing with ‘recurrent’ concepts, to identify the arguments exposed in the written 
observations from Member States and the EU Commission, and their acceptance or rejection 
in the final ruling of the Court.  
Thirdly, statistical analysis was deployed to establish relationships between the outcome of 
the case and the written observations. The analysis captures a) the interests of governments 
                                                                 
13 Carrubba, 2008, supra note 2 at 440. 
14 Cramér et a l. “See You in Luxembourg? EU Governments  ́Observations Under the Preliminary Reference Procedure” 
Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies SIEPS 2016:5, ava ilable at http://www.sieps.se/en/publications/2016/see-
you-in-luxembourg-eu-governments-observations-under-the-preliminary-reference-procedure-20165/ (accessed 16-08-
2018). 
15 The preliminary report is an internal court document that is drafted by the Reporting Judge and i t is circulated among the 
members of the chamber before the ruling. It has been published in the Court Repertoire until the year 2012 
16 Ki l roy, 1999, “Integration Through Law: ECJ and Governments in the EU.” Ph.D. diss. University of Ca lifornia, Los Angeles. 
17 Cramér, supra note 15 at 27. 
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in a particular legal concept; and b) the correlation of their submissions on the interpretation 
of individual copyright concepts with the outcome of the Court’s decision in each case. 
Together they produce a measure of influence for each Member State.  
To explore possible explanations for the observed patterns, finally, these findings were 
circulated among Court Agents and Civil Servants for feedback. This qualitative element 
allows a more subtle understanding of behaviour, and shapes the interpretation offered in 
our Conclusions. 
Sample construction 
Our sample includes only preliminary references, in line with all cited previous research, 
because these are central to the question of juridification of the European copyright policy 
process.18 Within our initial population of all 78 copyright cases registered between 1998 
and 2015, we identified 42 cases in which there was a ‘recurrence’ of the same legal issue 
(which we defined as five or more references to the CJEU on the same concept). The 
justification for reducing the sample to cases that dealt with concepts that were subject of 
repeat references is twofold. Pragmatically, it produced a manageable data set. More 
pertinently, the prevalence of certain legal issues within copyright law points to a normative 
void, i.e. a regulatory space within the acquis communautaire that stakeholders and 
Governments are trying to fill with alternative policy paths. This could be seen as an 
alternative to legislative action, or as an opportunity to correct earlier legislation or case 
law.19  
For these 42 ‘strategic’ cases, 170 case documents were compiled, consisting of the 
published court documents (Advocate General’s Opinion and the Court’s Ruling) and the 
written submissions by the European Commission and Member States that chose to 
intervene. Access to the content of ‘written observations’ was sought and obtained through 
contacting and interviewing Court Agents and Civil Servants, where possible. Some 
documents were received from other researchers 20 which kindly shared their own database. 
Gaps were filled by Freedom of Information requests to the European Commission and 
various Member States. The Court Registry also provided a number of older ‘Reports for the 
Hearing’ which are compiled by the Reporting Judge in most cases. Each of these documents 
may have numerous data points or ‘observations’, suggesting answers to multiple questions 
posed to the Court for a preliminary ruling. The final data set therefore contains a total of 
584 observations (for an overview, see Figure 8 below).21 
                                                                 
18 Breach proceedings brought by the Commission against allegedly infringing Member States were excluded. See Favale, 
Kretschmer, Torremans, supra note 5 at 38. 
19 See generally on this point Griffiths, “Constitutionalising or harmonising? – the Court of Justice, the right to property and 
European copyright law” 38 ELR (2013) 65-78; and van Eechoud, “Along the Road to Uniformity - Diverse Readings of the 
Court of Justice Judgments on Copyright Works” 3 (2012) JIPITEC 60. 
20 See note *, acknowledgements. 
21 The lack of transparency about Member States’ and the Commission’s interventions before the Court is troublesome, and 
wi l l be the subject of a separate article. There should not be a  need for freedom of information requests nor subterfuge (for 
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3.1. The normative role of the CJEU in the copyright literature 
 
There is consensus in the literature that Court of Justice is playing an increasingly central role 
in shaping not only the nuances but the contours of copyright law in Europe. Most academic 
analysis responds to specific rulings of the Court, often by means of individual case 
comments focussing on decisions that may be seen as seminal, or affect wider sectoral 
interests. With the dramatic increase in preliminary references since about 2008, the 
copyright rulings of the Court also become traceable as an emerging body of jurisprudence, 
inviting transversal and evolutionary treatment across a range of cases. Competition 
practices have been analysed by Preck22 and Stuik23. Charter rights perspectives have been 
developed by Oliver and Stothers 24. The exclusive right of communication to the public25 has 
been extensively discussed. Copyright exceptions are explored by a number of authors, in 
particular, the reproduction for private copy and the related levies to provide fair 
compensation26, the exception for parody27, the exception for libraries 28.  
Some scholars have taken issue with the so-called ‘normative’ role of the CJEU, stepping in 
when the law is not sufficiently clear or exhaustive.29 In our previous work30 we investigated 
the claims by this literature that the Court is pursuing a harmonising agenda,31 overstepping 
its mandate by an excessively teleological interpretation of the law.  
These systematic studies of the emerging European Copyright jurisprudence are central to 
our discourse because they define the doctrinal landscape of copyright which our empirical 
study seeks to explain. Mireille van Eechoud, Andreas Rahmatian and Eleonora Rosati for 
example, in separate works, focussed on the originality requirement as defined by the Court 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
example, reconstructing successful interventions from references to written observations in the Opinions of the Advocate 
General). We discuss how we obtained access to our source material in more detail in Appendix I  (The Confidentiality Issue). 
22 Prek and Lefèvre, “Competition Li tigation before the General Court: Quality i f not Quantity? 53 Common Market Law 
Review (2016) 65-90. 
23 Stuyck, “The Court of Justice and the Unfair Commercial Practice Directive”, 52 Common Market Law Review (2015) 721–
752. 
24 Ol iver and Stothers, “Intellectual Property under the Charter: Are the Court’s scales properly ca librated?” 54 Common 
Market Law Review (2017) 517-566. 
25  See Gri ffith, supra note 19 at 13; Rosati “Towards an EU-wide copyright? (Judicial) pride and (legislative) prejudice” 1 
I.P.Q. (2013) 47-68 at 11; Van Eechoud, supra Note 19 at 74; Leistner, “Europe’s copyright law decade: Recent case law of 
the European Court of Justice and policy perspectives” 51 Common Market Law Review  (2014) 559-600, at 569; AA.VV. 
“The Reference to the CJEU in Case C-466/12 Svensson” University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research 
Paper Series, 6/2013, available at  http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/ssrn/ (last accessed 30-06-17). 
26 Kretschmer, “Private Copying and Fair Compensation: An empirical s tudy of copyright levies in Europe” (Intellectual 
Property Office UK, 2011). 
27 Rosati, “Just a  laughing matter? Why the decision in Deckmyn is broader than parody” 52 Common Market Law Review 
(2015) 511–529. The European Copyright Society’s “Opinion on the Judgment of the CJEU in Case C-201/13 Deckmyn” 37(3) 
EIPR (2015) 127. 
28 Linklater, “Make me an offer I won’t regret: Offers to license works on acceptable terms cannot block libraries’ ‘right’ to 
digitize for access on dedicated terminals: Technische Universität Darmstadt” 52 Common Market Law Review (2015) 813-
823. 
29 See generally Gri ffiths, 2013 and van Eechoud, 2012 supra note 19. 
30 Fava le, Kretschmer and Torremans, supra note 5 at 36. 
31 Gri ffiths, supra note 19 at 24; van Eechoud, supra note 19 at 77;  Leistner, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. a t 
595. 
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in Infopaq and as confirmed in the following jurisprudence.32 Jonathan Griffiths and Martin 
Husovec analysed the role of fundamental rights in key cases addressing the liability of 
internet intermediaries.33 The most ambitious early analysis of the CJEU’s copyright 
jurisprudence as a whole is Matthias Leistner’s review of 2014.34  
Leistner aims to locate the key issues of law discussed before the court in the full range of 
copyright cases, which together give shape to a new body of European copyright law. He 
examines the originality requirement,35 the reproduction right,36 the communication right,37 
the distribution right,38 digital exhaustion,39 copyright exceptions,40 fair compensation,41 as 
well as the specific concept of communication to the public.42 He recognises both the 
horizontal range of the autonomous interpretation of copyright concepts and the vertical 
depth with which these concepts are discussed. The normative role of the Court, in his view, 
is a necessary complement of a legislative machine that has become more and more 
cumbersome.43 The activist role of the Courts with respect to copyright law should not be 
discouraged, but even supported by the use of preliminary references by Member States.44 
The significance of the conceptual developments identified by Leistner is confirmed by our 
empirical analysis which displays a disproportionately high concentration of cases on these 
topics. Most prominence is given to the concept of ‘communication to the public’, whose 
evolution through the jurisprudence of the CJEU provides a telling example of the Court’s 
normative role.  
  
                                                                 
32 See generally van Eechoud ibid. and Rosati supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. Rahmatian, “Originality in UK 
Copyright Law: The Old 'Skill and Labour' Doctrine Under Pressure” 44(4) International Review of Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law (2013) 4-34. 
33 Gri ffiths, supra note 19; Husovec, Injunctions Against Intermediaries in the European Union (Cambridge University Press, 
2017). 
34 See generally Leistner, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
35 Ibid. a t 564. 
36 Ibid. at 569. 
37 Ibid. at 569. 
38 Ibid. at 574. 
39 Ibid. at 574. 
40 Ibid. at 584. 
41 Ibid. at 586. 
42 Ibid. at 592. 
43 Leistner argues that the active role of the Court reflects “hydraulics of powers” in which the EU’s legislative role is 
waning. Ibid. at 599. 
44 Ibid. at 599. 
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3.2. The concept of ‘Communication to the public’ 
 
The question “who steers the development of law” presupposes that the law is 
indeterminate or offers sufficient flexibility for jurisprudence to take different directions. For 
the purposes of this study, it is useful to illustrate this claim with a specific example.  
The main EU provision regarding the exclusive right of communication to the public is found 
in Article 3 of Directive 2001/29.45 Three elements are included in the definition of a 
communication to the public: (i) it can take place by wire or through wireless means and (ii) 
on demand services and (iii) communications to the public are included. But all other 
elements and questions surrounding the concept of communication to the public and how it 
applies in a modern setting are left undefined.    
The international instruments, such as the Berne Convention46 and the WIPO Copyright 
Treaty 199647 (which Article 3 is implementing) do not add much detail either. That leaves 
plenty to play for when it comes to the interpretation of the concept of communication to 
the public.  
In a digital on-line environment, there is scope for rebroadcasting of many sorts. Hotels (and 
spas, clinics, etc.) have for years made centrally received broadcasts available in individual 
hotel rooms and lobbies, but in the same vein it is now possible to pick up a signal and 
stream it on-line, in real time or in delayed and edited format. Do these activities involve a 
new act of communication to the public and is there a new authorisation that needs to be 
paid for? Or is there, in all or in some of these circumstances, merely one original 
communication to the public? Broadcasters and hotels, to name just these, have opposite 
interests on this point. A narrow definition of communication to the public would favour the 
hotels and with them the national government that wants primarily to encourage the 
tourism industry. Those in favour of the content providing industry would on the other hand 
favour a broad interpretation. And whatever the answer was the Court eventually gave, a 
slight change in (technological) circumstances would mean that parties had an incentive to 
go back to the Court in the hope of obtaining a slightly different answer that favoured their 
interests.  
Similarly, how do we deal with hypertext links? Does the provision of such a link involve a 
new communication to the public of the copyright work that is found at the location to 
which the link directs the user? Parties with very different interests have an incentive to 
return to the Court to obtain a slightly different answer when new technologies emerge. 
                                                                 
45 Di rective 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonization of certain 
aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society [2001] OJ L 167/10. 
46 Berne Convention for the Protection of Li terary and Arti stic Works 1886, ava ilable at  
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/text.jsp?file_id=283693 (accessed 03-08-2017). 
47  WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996, ava ilable at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/text.jsp?file_id=295157 (accessed 
03-08-2017). 
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So how did the ‘Communication to the public’ case law of the Court take shape?  In the view 
of the Grand Chamber, who dealt with this topic in Reha Training48 in the aftermath of 
various judgments touching upon the topic, there are several complementary criteria, which 
are not autonomous and which are interdependent. Depending on the circumstances of the 
case these factors may be present to widely varying degrees.  As we will see, these criteria 
appeared at different stages in the development of the Court’s case-law and favour the 
position of different parties. The Grand Chamber is merely trying to bring them together in 
an overall framework, pointing to the Phonographic Performance Ireland49 case, where the 
Court ruled in favour of a (new) communication to the public in the hotel and therefore in 
favour of the rightholders by using certain of the criteria, whilst on the very same day 
favouring other criteria in the SCF50 case: no communication to the public in the dentist’s 
waiting room and hence favouring the position of the users. 
The Grand Chamber then takes as a starting point that there has to be both an act of 
communication and the communication of the work has to be to a public.  This is illustrated 
with the SBS Belgium51 case where the scenario of direct injection of broadcasts yielded an 
act of communication on behalf of the broadcasting stations, but no public. There was also 
an act of communication (and communication to the public overall) when add-ons that gave 
access to works without permission were pre-installed on a multimedia player.52 
An act of communication refers to any transmission of protected works, irrespective of the 
technical means or process used. And any transmission or retransmission which uses a 
specific technical means must separately be authorised.  Here the Court favours the interests 
of the rightholders. ITV v TV Catchup53 is a clear example of a case where parties returned to 
the Court to try and include, or exclude depending on the party concerned, on-line 
streaming of a television broadcast from the concept of an act of communication. 
Retransmission by internet streaming was eventually held to amount to a communication to 
the public in the later case.54 
Secondly, the work must be communicated to the public.  From the older cases, such as 
SGAE55, the Grand Chamber takes the basic idea that the concept of a public involves an 
indeterminate number of potential recipients and a fairly large number of persons, only to 
qualify that immediately with the teaching of SCF56 that the work must be made available in 
any appropriate manner to ‘persons in general’. Individuals belonging to a private group can 
                                                                 
48 Case C-117/15 Reha Training Gesellschaft für Sport- und Unfallrehabilitation mbH v Gesellschaft für musikalische 
Aufführungs- und mechanische Vervielfältigungsrechte eV (GEMA) ECLI:EU:C:2016:379. 
49 Case C-162/10 Phonographic Performance (Ireland) Limited v Ireland, Attorney General, ECLI:EU:C:2012:141.  
50 Case C-135/10 Società Consortile Fonografici (SCF) v Marco Del Corso ECLI:EU:C:2012:140. 
51 Case C-325/14 SBS Belgium NV v Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers (SABAM) 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:764. 
52 Case C-527/15 Stichting Brein v Wullems ECLI:EU:C:2017:300. 
53 Case C-607/11 ITV Broadcasting Ltd and Others v TVCatchUp Ltd ECLI:EU:C:2013:147. 
54 Case C-275/15 ITV v TV Catchup Ltd ECLI:EU:C:2017:144, at para  23. 
55 Case C-306/05 Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SA ECLI:EU:C:2006:764.  
56 Case C-117/15, supra note 43. 
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be excluded, as can be small or insignificant groups. The size of the audience is determined 
in the light of the potential cumulative effect of there being various audiences, either a large 
group at the same time or individuals or small groups in succession.57 
The Grand Chamber then also refers to the requirement of there being a new public, i.e. a 
public not taken into account by the rightholders when they authorised the original 
communication to the public.  This is where the line of cases involving the operators of cafes, 
restaurants, hotels and spas (and now also rehabilitation clinics) comes in. In each of these 
cases the Court held that there was a new public, but there was no public in the SCF case in 
dentist Del Corso’s waiting room. And neither was there a new public in the leading case in 
the sub-clusters of internet hypertext link cases, Svensson58.  The work linked had already 
been communicated to all internet users and the link, whilst involving an act of 
communication, could not reach a new public. Other cases then followed to see e.g. whether 
the same logic applied to framing scenarios.59 That was held to be the case, but on the other 
hand the posting on one website of a photograph previously posted on another website, 
without any restriction preventing it from being downloaded and with the consent of the 
copyright holder, did amount to a communication to the public and was distinguished from 
the hyperlinking scenario.60 
Further criteria highlighted by the Grand Chamber include the profit-making nature of the 
broadcast or rebroadcast involved and the receptivity of the public.  What becomes clear 
from the Grand Chamber’s attempt to propose a comprehensive approach is that in 
different cases different criteria will play a vital role.61 The emphasis will not only be placed 
on different points, there is also clear evidence that the Court brought each factor, as its 
case law developed. These criteria and their weighing will determine whether in a particular 
case there is a communication to the public or not and whose interests will eventually 
prevail. That point was again brought home by the Court’s second chamber in the GS 
Media62 case, when the for-profit argument and the knowledge point were emphasised and 
it was stated that “whether the fact of posting, on a website, hyperlinks to protected works, 
which are freely available on another website without the consent of the copyright holder, 
constitutes a ‘communication to the public’ within the meaning of that provision, it is to be 
determined whether those links are provided without the pursuit of financial gain by a 
person who did not know or could not reasonably have known the illegal nature of the 
publication of those works on that other website or whether, on the contrary, those links are 
provided for such a purpose, a situation in which that knowledge must be presumed.” This 
element was also important when the Court held that the operation of a sharing platform 
                                                                 
57 On the point of there being a public, see also case C-265/16 VCAST v RTI SpA ECLI:EU:C:2017:913. 
58 Case C-466/12 Nils Svensson and Others v Retriever Sverige AB ECLI:EU:C:2014:76. The analysis was confirmed in case C-
301/15 Soulier and Doke v Ministère de la Culture et de la Communication ECLI :EU :C :2016 :878 at para  36. 
59 See the order in case C‑348/13 BestWater International GmbH v Michael Mebes and Stefan Potsch ECLI:EU:C:2014:2315. 
60 As  i t was, amongst other reasons, not required for the sound operation of the Internet. Case C-161/17 Land Nordrhein -
Westfalen v Dirk Renckhoff ECLI:EU:C:2018:634. 
61 The need for an individual assessment was confirmed in case C-527/15 Stichting Brein v Wullems ECLI:EU:C:2017:300. 
62 Case C-160/15 GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV and others ECLI:EU:C:2016:644. 
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that through indexing data gave users access to copyright works amounted to a 
communication to the public.63 
The crucial point for this study is that we aim to determine whether the observations 
submitted by the parties (including their repeat submissions if cases and follow-on cases are 
brought deliberately) have influenced the development of the Court’s case law. This may 
provide indications of a deliberate strategy to bring cases to steer or alter the evolution of 
the case law of the Court. 
4. Recurrent Concepts in Copyright Litigation 
 
Having demonstrated for one central concept of EU copyright law how reasoning may be 
shaped, favouring one party or another, we now explain our selection of concepts for 
detailed empirical investigation. We reduced the complete population of 78 copyright cases 
(registered between 1998 and 2015) to 42 copyright cases that ruled on concepts that had 
been referred to the CJEU 5 times or more (which we term ‘recurrent’ concepts). We assume 
that these repeat references are an indication of a contested policy direction or a normative 
void, i.e. an opportunity by litigators and Member States to steer the evolving jurisprudence 
of the Court. This section identifies these cases and analyses which Member States appear to 
intervene on which underlying concepts. 
 
To this end, we have compiled two datasets: one in which we have coded the main issue 
discussed in each case, and one in which we have captured suggested answers to all 
questions referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling in each case. The dataset in which 
each case is coded according to the main issue discussed allows us a computation of the 
number of written observations submitted by each country. This becomes a measure of the 
interest of Member States in specific legal issues. Combined with the dataset coding 
suggested answers, this will allow an analysis of the correlation of written observations with 
the interpretation given in the ruling. 
 
Our empirical analysis of copyright litigation starts with the identification of the most 
common legal concepts submitted to the attention of the Court. Five clusters of legal issues 
emerge as dominant in the sample. These are: 1) Communication to the public, 2) Copyright 
exceptions, 3) Levies (fair compensation for private use), 4) Distribution Rights, 5) Liability of 
Intermediaries. All other legal issues have four or less occurrences within the sample of 78 
cases. It is reassuring that the copyright literature reviewed in Section 3.1. above confirms 
that these are indeed the topics of greatest doctrinal interest.  
 
The following tables offer descriptive statistics identifying the most common legal concepts 
discussed before the Court. The cases were coded according to all copyright legal issues 
                                                                 
63 Case C-610/15 Stichting Brein v Ziggo ECLI:EU:C:2017:456. 
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brought within each case. Cases often discuss multiple concepts. This identifies a total of 51 








Figure 2 – Recurrent Legal Concepts in CJEU Copyright Preliminary References 
 
The concept of Communication to the public, recalled in discussions surrounding Article 3 of 
the InfoSoc Directive, Art. 8 of the Rental and Lending Rights Directive, and Art. 2 of the 
Satellite Broadcasting Directive, is the most discussed, with 15 cases that refer it as the main 
issue. The issue of Levies, including discussions on the definition, quantification and sources 
Legal Concept as Main Issue Occurr %TOT Subm N %TOT
A3-A8 Communication to the public 15 19,2% 58 17,6%
A5.2(b) Fair compensation Private Use 9 11,5% 60 18,2%
A5 Exceptions 6 7,7% 20 6,1%
A4 Distribution Right 6 7,7% 17 5,2%
A8 Intermediaries 6 7,7% 30 9,1%
Others >=3 <5%
TOT Cases 78
TOT Cases w Recurrent Concepts (CRC) 42 54%
TOT Submissions 330
TOT Submissions in CRC 185 56%
TOT Average Ref/Sub 0,64
TOT Cluster Av. Ref/Sub 0,69
Most Recurrent Legal Concepts Occurr %TOT
A3-A8-A2 Communication to the public 17 33,3%
A5 Exceptions 11 21,6%
A5.2(b) Fair compensation Private Use 9 17,6%
A4 Distribution Right 8 15,7%
A8 Intermediaries 6 11,8%
Others <=4 7,8%
TOT Cases on Copyright 78
TOT Occurrence of Legal Concepts 51
TOT Cases with the above Legal Issues 42
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of the fair compensation for private reproduction (Art. 5.2(b) InfoSoc Directive) follows with 
9 cases and 11 total occurrences.  
However, if we consider the total number of submissions (i.e. attempts to influence the 
outcome) in cases in which the above two are the main legal concept discussed, we see that 
Fair compensation is leading, followed by Communication to the public. It is also interesting 
to compare the sum of the submissions elicited by these two legal issues (Communication to 
the public, and Levies), which outruns the sum of the submissions elicited by the other three 
legal issues. This indicates that parties to the litigation think most is to be gained from 
steering the Court on these issues. Moreover, it is notable that while litigation on Copyright 
Exceptions and Distribution rights has occurred more often than preliminary references on 
the potential liability of Internet Intermediaries (e.g. filtering or monitoring obligations for 
service providers) the total number of submission for the latter outnumbers the former by a 
ratio of 30:17. The stakes appear to be higher. 
We need to consider that Member States do not have a say on what cases will be sent 
before the CJEU, as this is decided by national judiciaries.64 However, it is entirely at the 
Governments’ discretion to submit written observations in a given case.65 Therefore we 
assume that the total number of submissions on a given legal concept can serve as one 
indicator of the interest of Member States in that issue. This figure however needs to be 
adjusted to other indicators, as the next section shows. 
We now turn to examine more in depth who are the most active governments in submitting 
legal observations before the Court, and to explore their interest in specific copyright issues. 
5. Litigation behaviour of Member States 
5.1. Repeat Players in Copyright 
 
According to previous research, it is clear that governments use participation in litigation to 
try to obtain favourable decisions because they understand that they can influence EU 
jurisprudence through good written observations.66 Moreover, governments have realised 
                                                                 
64 However, i t has been theorised that some cases are willingly ‘pushed’ before the court in order to foster discussion on 
certa in subject-matters. See generally Amado et al. “Lobbying at the European Court of Justice? Yes, we can!” Paper for 
Professor Guéguen’s lecture “Interest groups and Lobbies in the European Union” (POLI- O505) online at 
http://www.pacteurope.eu/pact/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Lobbying-at-the-European-Court-of-Justice.pdf (accessed 
25-10-16). [no longer available] 
65 Some Member States intervene routinely in cases where the preliminary reference comes from their own country. The 
more s trategic governments appear to intervene also in cases which do not directly involve their own country. For further 
discussion of this point, see Section 5 below. 
66 Conant, Justice Contained: Law and Politics in the European Union (Cornell University Press, 2002) at 23; see also 
generally Cul len and Charlesworth, ‘Diplomacy by other means: the use of legal basis litigation as a political s trategy by the 
European Parliament and Member States’ (1999) 36 Common Market Law Review 1243. 
 15 
that with a successful written observation before the Court they can obtain the reversal of 
European acts that they have opposed without success in the EU Council.67 
At first sight, the number of written observations in preliminary references points to the 
Member States most invested in copyright litigation before the Court.  We have computed 
these written observations by country, obtaining a ranking of these countries. France and 
Italy seem the most invested, followed by the UK and then Spain, Poland, Germany, Austria, 
Finland, Poland, Czech Republic, Belgium and the Netherlands. However, previous research68 
suggests that in order to identify the most strategic countries we need to control for the 
number of written observations in their own preliminary references. In fact, some national 
litigation offices are mandated by the central government to intervene in all preliminary 
references submitted from their own countries. It is therefore important to understand to 
what extent Goverments’ interventions derive from preliminary references originating from 
their own country. The following table captures the relationship between the number of 
written observations responding to a country’s own preliminary references and the overall 




Figure 3 – Copyright Repeat Players 
  
                                                                 
67 Granger, “States as Successful Li tigants before the European Court of Justice: Lessons from the ‘Repeat Players’ of 
European Li tigation” 1 CYELP 2 (2006) 27-49 at 33. 
68 Granger, 2004, supra note 3 at 3. 
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The comparison between a) the number of written observations submitted by one country, 
b) the number of preliminary references originating from that country, and c) the number of 
submission of this country within preliminary references originating from the same country, 
produces insights about the propensity to litigation of the various Member States. When for 
example the number of preliminary references is equal to the number of submissions in 
their own preliminary references and higher than the submissions in other cases, there is a 
propensity to litigation which is directly proportional to the number of ‘external’ 
submissions. This indicates a likely mandate by this Government to intervene in their own 
country’s preliminary references, but it is also invested in litigation irrespective of this 
mandate. When however, other variables being equal, the number of submissions 
responding to preliminary references originating from their own country is lower, this 
indicates that this Government is conscious of the effects of preliminary references in its 
own country, and therefore tends to intervene selectively even if not mandated. We argue 
that this indicates an investment in litigation according to policy interest, pointing to more 
strategic behaviour. The more a Government intervenes in preliminary reference originating 
from other countries, the more strategic the litigation behaviour. 
5.2. Control: Total CJEU litigation for the same period 
 
The analysis above needs to be controlled for a number of factors, such as GDP and overall 
propensity to litigate before the Court of Justice. Below the number of interventions in all 
copyright cases (population of 78 cases registered 1998-2015) is displayed next to the GDP 
of each country. We can observe that the litigation activity of Governments is not always 
proportional to their country’s GDP. For example, Germany and the Netherlands display a 
low number of interventions despite their relatively high wealth. For other countries 
however the relation between propensity to litigation and size of economy is more evident, 





Figure 4 – Ranking of Member States by GDP and by number of interventions in Copyright 
litigation 
 
The overall propensity to litigation on the acquis communautaire of copyright needs to be 
understood within the context of the overall investment in litigation of each member state 
before the CJEU. The table below compares the overall number of submissions in concluded 
preliminary references by EU Member States for the same timeframe as the population of 
copyright cases (78 cases registered between 1998 and 2015). It can be observed that some 
countries are active litigators before the CJEU but do not seem to be focussing specifically on 
copyright law. This is the case, for example, of France, Italy, and Germany. Conversely, 
countries with a high ratio between overall litigation and copyright litigation seem to invest 
specifically on this policy issue. These countries include the Czech Republic, Poland and 
Finland.69 The figure below illustrates the pattern by calculating for each Member State the 
ratio of copyright interventions as a share of overall litigation before the Court of Justice. 
 
                                                                 
69 The lower the number of interventions, the less reliable the figures. See for example Malta. 
Rank Country 2016 Rank Country Submissions
1 DE 3,494.898 1 IT 24
2 UK 2,649.893 2 FR 24
3 FR 2,488.284 3 UK 19
4 IT 1,852.499 4 ES 17
6 ES 1,252.163 5 PL 15
7 NL 769.930 6 DE 16
11 PL 473.501 7 AT 15
12 BE 465.248 8 FI 14
13 AT 384.799 9 PT 12
16 IE 254.596 10 CZ 11
17 FI 234.578 11 BE 10
18 PT 205.085 12 NL 10
19 EL 194.594 13 EL 6
20 CZ 185.269 14 IE 7
22 HU 117.729 15 HU 3
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Figure 5 – Control: Overall litigation rates compared to copyright litigation rates 
 
When we consider the country submissions for each of the clusters identified in Section 2, 
we have another interesting picture. Some countries, despite their overall involvement in EU 
litigation and their extremely high involvement in copyright litigation, are in fact interested 
only in a limited number of legal issues. It might be suggested that they intervene only on 
topics that are relevant for their domestic policy and where they hope to make an impact. 
Below are the figures on the copyright submissions from each country broken down by main 
legal concept in the case. 
 
Country Overall Submissions Country Copyright Submissions Country Ratio C/O
MT 2 MT 1 MT 50%
CZ 48 CZ 11 CZ 23%
PL 80 PL 15 PL 19%
FI 95 FI 14 FI 15%
IE 58 IE 7 IE 12%
LT 37 LT 4 LT 11%
PT 126 PT 12 PT 10%
FR 503 FR 24 FR 5%
ES 374 ES 17 ES 5%
UK 457 UK 19 UK 4%
EL 146 EL 6 EL 4%
AT 470 AT 15 AT 3%
SK 32 SK 1 SK 3%
HU 121 HU 3 HU 2%
IT 1054 IT 24 IT 2%
BE 529 BE 10 BE 2%
RO 109 RO 2 RO 2%
NL 604 NL 10 NL 2%
SE 121 SE 2 SE 2%
BG 83 BG 1 BG 1%
DE 1478 DE 16 DE 1%
DK 134 DK 1 DK 1%
 19 
 
Figure 6 – Repeat Players on individual Legal Concepts 
 
If we consider the number of interventions of the top three copyright litigators, France, Italy 
and the UK, within the five legal copyright issues in our dataset, we observe the following: 
France appears most interested in Communication to the Public and Distribution rights; it is 
less interested in Fair compensation for private reproduction (Levies) and not at all in 
Copyright Exceptions and the responsibility of Intermediaries. Italy, likewise, seems to be 
interested (and ready to invest) in Communication to the Public, Copyright Exceptions and 
Intermediaries, while neglecting the other issues. The UK, on the contrary, allocates its 
investments among all these issues. The behaviour of other countries, carefully picking their 
interventions, is interesting. See for example the focus on Levies from Finland and Spain. 
The brief analysis above suggests that Governments’ interventions in European case law is – 
at least in most cases – strategic; countries tend to invest most in topics relevant for their 
domestic policies. However, this picture needs to be read by taking into account the routine 
intervention of some countries in cases where officials are mandated to intervene in 
preliminary references originating from their own country. 
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6. The Performance of Government submissions and their support of Rightholders 
or Users 
 
After the identification of Repeat Players in copyright and their propensity and specific 
interest in copyright litigation we move to the core of this study. We now aim to analyse the 
success rate of the written observations of each country and the proximity of their 
arguments to the positions of rightholders or users. To this end, we have extracted all 
copyright-related questions asked within preliminary references and the suggested answers 
proposed by the submissions of the intervening parties.70  
Our sample of 42 cases dealing with the five most contested (‘recurrent’) copyright issues 
has been coded by each legal question asked in the preliminary reference to the Court and 
each suggested answer by the parties, the AG and the intervening third parties. 147 
questions were identified, to which a variable number of governments suggested an answer. 
Most of these answers were coded with a Yes or No. When the suggested answer could not 
be reduced to a Yes/No answer, it was coded with an X. Only the answers coded with a Yes 
or No where considered for statistical computation.  
Overall, from the sources discussed in detail in the methodology section (AG Opinions, Court 
Registry, Agents, Freedom of Information requests) we retrieved a total of 584 suggested 
answers within the sample of 42 cases and excluding the countries that made only one 
submission (such as Romania, Norway, Sweden, Latvia). In addition to these, the total 
number of questions not answered with a Yes or No (and therefore coded with an X) is 
136.71 The next figure provides an example of the coding of a case.  
Case C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard Verlags GmbH was a preliminary reference from 
Austria (decided by the CJEU in 2012).72 A number of German and Austrian newspapers, 
magazines and websites had published photographs of a girl that had escaped after being 
held in captivity for eight years. The photos were taken by Ms Painer (a photographer) while 
the girl was at nursery school before she was abducted in 1998 (aged 10). She was held 
captive until she escaped in 2006. This was a huge media story. 
                                                                 
70 The questions are extracted from the Opinion of the Advocate General (AG) in a way requiring a Yes or No answer. We 
have chosen to elaborate the questions from the Opinion of the AG and not from the Application because the structure of 
the questions and answers in the ruling mostly follows the pattern of questions as reorganised by the AG. Also, the 
suggested answers in the written observations ci ted by the AG, which forms the basis for this part of the analysis, follows 
the same structure. 
71 There are 30 (=5.8%) missing data points where neither freedom of information requests nor reconstruction from other 
sources produced sufficient information to code a country’s suggested answer to a  question. 
72 Case C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard Verlags GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2013:138. 
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Figure 7 – Coding example 
 
As a next step, the answers were coded for ‘match with ruling’, i.e. if the suggested answer 
from the country corresponded to the answer given by the Court of Justice in the ruling. This 
allows the assessments of correlations between the interventions of each third party with 
the outcome of cases. In addition, the suggested answers and the rulings by the Court were 
coded for ‘match with Rightholder’ and ‘match with User’ (which is widely understood to 
include Intermediaries). This is useful to assess the position of the intervening third party 
towards these interests. 
 
In the following table, these matches have been ordered by legal concept under discussion. 
The table gives the overview of the number of ‘matches’ with the Ruling, with the 
Rightholder and with the User/Intermediary. The percentages in the table give the ratio 
between the ‘matches with ruling’ and the number of suggested answers. In other words, 
the ratio also reflects the suggested answers that did not match with the ruling. Therefore, 
in order to assess the performance of each government the percentages are the key 
indicators, not the absolute numbers.73  
  
                                                                 
73 Where there are low numbers of interventions or a lack of data points, percentages need to be treated with caution (see 
for example the case of Hungary). Since the numbers in the dataset are too low to test for s tatistical significance, we 
address this i ssue by constructing a  Cartesian diagram. 
C 145/10 Painer (Rh) vs Standard VerlagsGmbH et al (Us)
QUESTION OP JU Rh Us AT ES IT EUComm
Q4 Have portrait photos weaker copyright protection (Aet 
1&5 InfoSoc and Human Rights?) N N N X N N N N
Q3a Does art 5(3)(e) applies or an official order of publication 
must come from the authorities(Y)? N Y Y N N Y N
Q3b Can newpapers decide for themselves whether it is a 
matter pf public security? N N N Y N N N
Q3c Must the newspaper expressly call for help from the 
reader for identification? X X Y N Y X
Q2a Is Art 5(3)(d) InfoSoc applicable where the medium in 
which the quotation can be found is not itself afforded 
copyright protection? Y Y N Y Y Y N Y
Q2b Is Art 5(3)(d) InfoSoc applicable where the author of the 
published photo is not named in the reports? N N N Y N N N N
Suggested answer 5 6 3 5
Match Ruling 4 5 2 4
Match RH 3 5 3 3
Match US 2 1 2 2
Not Answered 1
Missing DP 1 3
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Figure 8 – Government submissions’ match with Rightholder or User interests and CJEU 
Ruling (sample of 42 cases, discussing 5 ‘recurrent’ legal issues) 
 
Communication to the Public - Art3 - Art8 InfoSoc AT BE CZ DE EL ES FI FR HU IE IT NL PL UK PT LT EUComm Ruling
Match With Ruling 57% 64% 50% 0% 29% 67% 59% 100% 42% 60% 60% 50% 38% 48%
Match With Right Holder 86% 73% 50% 0% 43% 83% 72% 75% 8% 50% 80% 70% 13% 36% 60%
Match with User 29% 27% 43% 100% 29% 17% 25% 25% 92% 40% 20% 20% 88% 56% 48%
Match With Ruling 4 0 7 7 0 2 4 19 4 5 6 0 3 5 3 0 24
Match With Right Holder 6 0 8 7 0 3 5 23 3 1 5 0 4 7 1 0 18 29
Match with User 2 0 3 6 5 2 1 8 1 11 4 0 1 2 7 0 28 23
Data Points 7 0 11 14 5 7 6 32 4 12 10 0 5 10 8 0 50 48
Cases 2 2 3 2 3 2 9 2 3 4 3 4 2 15 15
A5.2(b)Fair compensation - levies (private copy)
Match With Ruling 45% 20% 33% 56% 33% 38% 64% 68% 100% 100% 58% 0% 63% 100% 63% 81%
Match With Right Holder 82% 60% 67% 56% 50% 33% 45% 58% 0% 0% 50% 0% 13% 0% 25% 30% 37%
Match with User 100% 20% 33% 22% 50% 48% 50% 58% 50% 100% 50% 0% 88% 88% 75% 70% 57%
Match With Ruling 5 1 1 5 2 8 14 13 0 2 3 7 2 5 8 5 22
Match With Right Holder 9 3 2 5 3 7 10 11 0 0 0 6 5 1 0 2 8 13
Match with User 11 1 1 2 3 10 11 11 0 1 3 6 1 7 7 6 19 20
Data Points 11 5 3 9 6 21 22 19 0 2 3 12 7 8 8 8 27 35
Cases 7 2 2 2 2 5 7 4 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 9 9
Distribution Rights (Dist2thePub Art 4 InfoSoc)
Match With Ruling 100% 100% 100% 17% 0% 78%
Match With Right Holder 100% 100% 100% 67% 0% 56% 78%
Match with User 0% 0% 0% 33% 100% 44% 22%
Match With Ruling 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 7
Match With Right Holder 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 5 7
Match with User 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 4 2
Data Points 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 6 2 0 0 9 9
Cases 1 1 2 3 1 6 6
Copyright Exceptions (Art 5 InfoSoc)
Match With Ruling 35% 100% 100% 33% 75% 71% 100% 100% 64%
Match With Right Holder 29% 20% 50% 100% 50% 57% 0% 0% 54% 56%
Match with User 71% 80% 50% 0% 50% 71% 100% 100% 39% 44%
Match With Ruling 6 5 0 4 5 1 3 0 0 0 5 0 3 1 0 0 18
Match With Right Holder 5 1 0 2 5 3 2 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 15 14
Match with User 12 4 0 2 1 0 2 0 0 0 5 0 3 1 0 0 11 11
Data Points 17 5 0 4 6 3 4 0 0 0 7 0 3 1 0 0 28 25
Cases 2 1 1 2 1 4 2 1 6 6
Intermediaries - Art 8 Enforcement Directive
Match With Ruling 33% 100% 100% 50% 60% 60% 100% 60% 80%
Match With Right Holder 100% 0% 33% 50% 80% 40% 50% 60% 50% 36%
Match with User 0% 100% 33% 50% 40% 40% 50% 40% 50% 55%
Match With Ruling 1 2 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 3 4 3 0 0 8
Match With Right Holder 3 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 2 2 3 0 0 5 4
Match with User 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 5 6
Data Points 3 2 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 5 5 4 5 0 0 10 11
Cases 1 2 2 2 5 3 2 3 6 6
TOTAL AT BE CZ DE EL ES FI FR HU IE IT NL PL UK PT LT EUComm Ruling
Match With Ruling 42% 67% 67% 59% 41% 38% 65% 65% 100% 50% 68% 59% 52% 54% 69% 63% 60%
Match With Right Holder 61% 33% 67% 52% 47% 44% 53% 69% 75% 7% 52% 47% 60% 42% 6% 25% 41% 52%
Match with User 66% 58% 28% 37% 53% 38% 44% 35% 25% 86% 56% 47% 36% 54% 88% 75% 54% 48%
MatchRul=Rh 10 1 8 10 1 9 10 25 2 2 7 2 7 4 0 0 37
MatchRul=Us 5 6 3 6 1 6 11 12 1 1 7 2 6 9 6 6 35
Match With Ruling 16 8 12 16 7 12 22 35 4 7 17 10 13 14 11 5 75
Match With Right Holder 23 4 12 14 8 14 18 37 3 1 13 8 15 11 1 2 51 67
Match with User 25 7 5 10 9 12 15 19 1 12 14 8 9 14 14 6 67 62
Data Points 38 12 18 27 17 32 34 54 4 14 25 17 25 26 16 8 124 128
Cases 12 5 7 6 4 11 12 15 2 5 15 6 12 12 5 3 42 42
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Analysis 
The following analysis focusses on general trends that emerge for the juridification of the 
European policy process regarding the five ‘recurrent’ legal issues (which mark a normative 
void in copyright law). A fuller doctrinal context for each the five legal issues, and of the 
interests at the heart of individual Government submissions is given in Appendix III. 
The issue of Communication to the public is particularly contentious. Consensus among 
Member States’ observations is rare, and it is limited to particularly simple features of this 
concept (acte clair). For example, it is uncontroversial that installation of TV sets in hotel 
rooms does not amount to Communication to the public, and that ISP are intermediaries in 
the light of Article 8 of the InfoSoc Directive. On most nuances surrounding the 
interpretation of the concept of Communication to the public, the written observations of 
governments and EU Commission disagree. SGAE, Phonographic Performance and GS Media 
are among the most notable example of this disagreement. The position of France, among 
the submitting governments, is to be noted as being often in disagreement with the others. 
However, this is not as to say that the other countries agree among themselves on every 
point. The impact of governments’ observation on the rulings on this specific topic is also 
erratic and difficult to pin down. Sometimes the Court follows the opinion of the majority (as 
for example in SCF); in other occasions the ruling follows the minority (as for example in GS 
Media). This data indicates that the influence of a Member State does not depend on the 
number of its allies. The number of submissions from a given governments on a given topic, 
combined with its success rate (number of matches between its suggested answers and the 
ruling) gives a more reliable indicator.  
In the case of Communication to the public, the figures computed above indicate France as a 
rather unchallenged protagonist. Other countries, such as Italy, the UK, Ireland, Spain, and 
Germany, have produced each about half of the number of submissions of France. Often, 
they take the same stance among each other before the Court, but they tend to succeed 
mostly when they reach critical mass (e.g. when they coordinate their efforts: see SCF) or 
when the question is not particularly controversial (and France does not intervene). 
The legal issue of Fair compensation (levies) is the one that received the highest attention 
from member states, with the highest number of submissions in our sample. Finland, Spain 
and Austria, among these countries, are the most active. Their success before the Court is 
not consistent. Generally, Spain pushes for broader country self-determination and more 
flexibility in choosing the features of the levy systems, whereas Finland vouches for a more 
narrow interpretation of the directive, for example by supporting compensation only for 
‘personal’ copies. Overall the Court favours this latter interpretation. Other countries, like 
Germany and the UK, rarely intervene on this delicate legal concept, but when they do so 
their suggested answers are normally accepted by the Court. France keeps an intermediate 
stance between Spain and Finland: it normally pushes for a strong protection of the 
rightholder, and it often succeeds in convincing the Court of its arguments. 
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On Distribution rights, Article 4 of the InfoSoc Directive is broadly interpreted by the Court, 
which protects the exclusive right of the European owner against infringement coming from 
non-EU countries. There seem to be a consensus on the point that international exhaustion 
does not apply and works sold or offered on foreign web sites are infringing, as well as works 
manufactured in countries with temporary exemption from copyright protection.74 With the 
only exception of Poland, which seldom manages to convince the Court, the other 
submitting countries suggest answers that are in line both with the Ruling and the Opinion. 
On Exceptions, we can detect a rather balanced approach of the Court (as confirmed by our 
previous research75) with a number of broad interpretations against an equivalent number 
of narrow interpretations. The data on the submitting countries is insufficient to determine 
with a degree of reliability what country is in favour of broad interpretation and what 
country is against. The available data suggests that the majority of the countries are for a 
narrow interpretation of copyright exceptions, but their degree of success in front of the 
court is erratic. 
The trends identified can be translated into a Cartesian diagram, in order to give an overview 
of the relative level of influence of each Member State (and European Commission) and their 
respective stance in support of rightholders or users. For constructing the graph, the Yes/No 
coding has been translated into numerical values. Each ‘match with ruling’ was assigned a 
value of 1, whereas to each suggested answer not matched in the ruling the value of -1 was 
assigned. Likewise, to each ‘match with the rightholder’ the value of 1 was assigned and to 
each position against the rightholder (for user or intermediary) the value of -1 was assigned. 
These latter figures differ slightly from the previous table because the cases in which 
rightholders and users held the same position (very few occurrences) where not computed. 
The Cartesian diagram give a better idea of the relative position of the countries to each 
other, and of their performance even in the case of low number of observations. The 
‘investment’ in copyright litigation is conveyed by proxy with the number of written 
observations for each country, displayed in the graph by the size of the circles.  
 
                                                                 
74 See the case of overlapping design and copyright protection as in C-168/09 – Flos ECLI:EU:C:2011:29. See generally 
Bently, “The return of industrial copyright?”, 34(10) EIPR (2012) 654-672. 
75 Fava le, Kretschmer, Torremans, 2016, supra note 5 at 58. 
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Figure 9 – Cartesian diagram illustrating Member State/Commission influence and 
promotion of Rightholder or User/Intermediary interest 
 
The most striking finding captured by this diagram is how close the Commission is to the 
Court. Submissions by the Commission correlate highly with the Court’s rulings and 
intervene particularly effectively on behalf of user interests. A second important finding is 
that, collectively, the submissions by Members States are above the influence line, correctly 
predicting the Court’s rulings. This aligns with arguments from the political science literature 
that the Court needs to maintain political legitimacy.76  
 
France stands out for its superior level of influence and for its support for rightholders. 
Finland is also very effective, but more balanced in its choice of support, as is Germany. 
Austria and Greece appear to be the least successful countries. Interesting is the effective 
performance of some ‘smaller’ players such as the Czech Republic and Portugal. As for the 
balance between rightholders and users, the evidence here suggests a prevalence of 
rightholder support, counterbalanced by the strong presence of the EU Commission in the 
users’ playfield. Few countries, among them Portugal, Ireland and the United Kingdom, 
regularly advance the users’ (and intermediaries’) perspective. 
This analysis is particularly relevant in the current exceptional European context, which 
might exclude from this picture the participation of the United Kingdom at some point in the 
                                                                 
76 See Carrubba et al., 2008, supra note 2; Garrett et al., 1998, supra note 11. 
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future.77 While the above scenario, as it stands, shows an overall – yet delicate – balance, 
the disappearance of the United Kingdom’s voice before the Court is likely to have 
consequences for the recognition of interests of copyright users and intermediaries.  
7. Conclusion: The making of a transnational rule of law 
 
Our series of studies on the CJEU’s copyright jurisprudence was initially motivated by a 
specific normative void that seemed to be filled by judicial policy making. But when we lifted 
the lid in our underpinning study78 revealing the workings of the Court, it became clear that 
the empirical approach would have much wider theoretical implications.  
Never before had a dataset of been produced that allowed to isolate the influence of 
Member States on the evolution of jurisprudence in a specific subject domain. We were 
observing the making of transnational law from a new perspective. Our findings suggest a 
potentially transformative advance in the understanding of the ‘production of Europe’. 
Our method makes it possible to construct influence rankings, quantifying the jurisprudential 
relationship between Member States, the European Commission and the Court of Justice in 
the judification of policy. This is extendable to other areas of law. 
In the specific area of copyright law, the study allowed us to target the forces moving 
jurisprudence. We found that copyright interventions revolve mainly around the concepts of 
Communication to the public and Copyright levies (private copying), with Exceptions, 
Distribution rights and Intermediaries also attracting considerable attention. The analysis of 
recurrent legal issues before the Court of Justice confirms that there are areas of copyright 
law vulnerable to strategic litigation, arguably because of a normative void.  
We found that through written observations, Governments aim to steer the Court towards 
rulings in line with their respective policies. Member States most invested in copyright law 
are the dominant litigators of the acquis communautaire in general (France: 15 out of 42 
cases in our sample, Italy: 15 cases, the UK: 12 cases), although there are other Member 
States that invest disproportionately in shaping the evolution of copyright law (Czech 
Republic: 7, The Netherlands: 6, Portugal: 5, Belgium: 5).  
Some governments’ interventions are highly skewed, addressing repeatedly very specific 
copyright issues, which are presumably relevant for their own domestic policies. France for 
example seems to be particularly interested in the concept of Communication to the public. 
Italy appears particularly interested in Exceptions and Intermediaries, while the UK allocates 
                                                                 
77 Arnold, Bently, Derclaye, Dinwoodie, “The Legal Consequences of Brexit Through the Lens of IP Law”, 101(2) Judicature 
(forthcoming), Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 15/2017, University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper 
No. 21/2017. 
78 Fava le, Kretschmer, Torremans, 2016, supra note 5. 
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its investment in litigation across all copyright policy areas. Germany intervenes rarely (only 
in 6 cases in our sample) but is often successful when it does. 
The impact of a written observation on the ruling of the Court is not only determined by 
critical mass, such as the number of submissions or the size of the country. More important 
appears to be the quality of the legal reasoning, as the relative success of smaller Repeat 
Players suggests (for example, Finland and Portugal). In this context, it is interesting to note 
the relative lack of success of certain governments that specifically invested in copyright 
litigation but who are seldom rewarded by the Court, such as Austria, Spain and Poland. 
Poland’s written observations are often ignored both by the Advocate General and the Court 
for unclear reasons. 
Finally, it is interesting to read the above findings in the light of the political scenario 
predicting the loss of the United Kingdom as a strong litigator. Our evidence suggests that 
the UK carries weight in advancing the perspective of copyright users before the Court of 
Justice. There are not sufficient data points at this stage to test for statistical significance, 
but the pattern we identify points to a potential disturbance in the delicate balance between 
the interests of rightholders and users before the Court. 
The findings in the domain of copyright law are striking. The extraordinary closeness of the 
Commission to the Court of Justice stands out, as does the apparent desire by the Court to 
maintain legitimacy by moving with Member States’ interventions (collectively understood). 




APPENDIX I: The Confidentiality Issue 
 
Documentary material for our research consists of case documents of the Preliminary 
References included in our sample. In particular, the Ruling, the Opinion by the Advocate 
General, and the written observations from Governments and the Commission are the 
primary sources of our study. While the Ruling and the Opinion for each case are available 
on the CJEU website,79 Government and Commission Submissions are not publicly available. 
They are treated as ‘confidential’. 
We first contacted the Court Registry in order to apply for access to these documents, 
although aware that the Court is not mentioned among the EU institutions currently subject 
to the current EU regulation to access public documents.80  We thought we could rely on a 
number of factors: a) our purpose to access for scientific research; b) the promise to keep 
the document confidential; c) the justification for exclusion of judiciary documents in current 
EU and national regulations (which in our opinion does not apply to our case).  
The Registry responded to us that they cannot grant access to the submission because the 
Government Submissions are confidential. This is not the place to fully argue what we call 
‘the confidentiality issue’ of the submissions before the CJEU. However, we thought it would 
be useful to explain the special status of judiciary documents (factor c). 
In EU member states, Freedom of Information Acts (FOIA) or equivalent laws provide the 
fundamental freedom to access administrative documents, in order to promote citizen 
participation in the democratic process. These documents normally refer to the deeds of the 
public administration. In many cases, these regulations provide for a number of exclusions, 
normally to protect the public interest, or trade secrets, or privacy. In some of these81 
judicial proceedings are not excluded per se, but only when the proceedings could be 
endangered by the disclosure. The British FOIA for example excludes access to 
administrative documents when justified by the need to preserve the administration of 
justice.82 The French corresponding law excludes the documents whose disclosure would 
harm judicial proceedings.83 In both cases, it is arguable that possible harm can only occur 
                                                                 
79 <http://curia.europa.eu/> 
80 REGULATION (EC) No 1049/2001 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 30 May 2001 regarding public 
access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, OJEC L 145/43 31.05.2001 (hereinafter ‘Regulation’). 
81 Since a  comprehensive analysis of the confidentiality i ssue is not the object of this paper, we cannot provide data for a ll 
the EU Member States. 
82 s .31(1)(c) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, onl ine at <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/36/contents> 
(accessed 29-8-16) 
83 Art. L 311-5 1(f) I I I  Livre of the Code des relations entre le public et l 'administration available at 
<https ://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=EC81FBDD47E7DFC61E67FA6722180535.tpdila09v_2?idSectionT
A=LEGISCTA000031367696&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000031366350&dateTexte=20160830> (accessed 30-08-16). 
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during the proceeding, not after. Moreover, not all FOIAs mention judicial proceedings 
among the exclusions.84  
The EU has its own version of a FOIA in the form of Regulation 1049/02, which allows access 
to the documents issued by the three main EU institutions: The Parliament, the Council and 
the Commission. Since the CJEU is formally excluded by this Regulation, it has issued at the 
end of 2012 a Decision85 that largely borrowed from the norms and principles of the 
Regulation. However, with this Decision the Court grants access to the documents it holds 
“in the exercise of its administrative function”.  This principle would exclude the documents 
held for the purpose of its judiciary function. 
Also these European FOIAs include a number of exceptions 86  to the freedom to access 
administrative documents. The Regulation for example excludes a number of cases where 
the disclosure would undermine the protection of commercial interest, court proceedings or 
legal advice.87 These exceptions however are subject to limits. In particular, they do not 
apply if there is an overriding public interest to the disclosure.88 Even more interestingly for 
our study, limits to the access to the Court documents are limited to the time frame during 
which this prohibition is justified.89  
Importantly, our application to access Government submissions only relates to cases already 
concluded; and otherwise our access to these documents would not affect any of the 
specific interests mentioned above, either by the national or European regulations.  In fact, 
the exclusion of court proceedings in the above-mentioned regulations neither affects those 
that protect a sensitive interest (public interest, personal or sensitive data, trade secrets), or 
those whose disclosure would affect the proceeding itself.  
The CJEU in its own jurisprudence considered the excludability of court pleadings from 
disclosure in Sweden v. API, and concluded that judicial deeds can be excluded per se, 
                                                                 
84 Ita ly, for example, does not include judicial proceedings per se among the exceptions l isted in Art. 24, L. n. 241/1990 
("Nuove norme in materia di procedimento amministrativo e di diritto di accesso ai documenti amministrativi") Gazzetta 
Ufficiale del 18 agosto 1990 n. 192,  as  modified by L. 15/2005. The law is available online at 
http://www.altalex.com/documents/codici-altalex/2014/12/09/legge-sul-procedimento-amministrativo.  
Other countries, such as the Scandinavians, grant full access to a ll public documents, including Court proceedings, unless a 
superior interest i s endangered. 
85 DECISION OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION of December 2012 concerning public access to 
documents held by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the exercise of its administrative functions (2013/C 38/02) 
(hereinafter “Decision”). Article 1. Scope 1. “The present decision shall apply to a ll documents held by the Court of Justice 
of the European Union, that is to say, documents drawn up or received by i t and in i ts possession, as part of the exercise of 
i ts  administrative functions”. 
86 Decision, Exceptions  2. “The Court of Justice of the European Union shall refuse access to a document where disclosure 
would undermine the protection of: 
— commercial interests of a natural or legal person, including intellectual property, — court proceedings and legal advice, 
— the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits”. 
87 Art. 4.2 of the Regulation, which excludes, among others ‘court proceedings and legal advice’. 
88 Decision, Art. 4: ‘The exceptions set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 shall not apply i f there is an overriding public interest in 
disclosure of the document concerned’. 
89 Art. 7 Regulation and Art. 6 Decision: “The exceptions as laid down in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 shall apply only for the period 
during which protection is justified on the basis of the content of the document…” 
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because of the need to preserve the ‘serenity of judgements’90 and the ‘equality of arms’.91 
This case is interesting because the Court argues the rationale of the EU legislation (from the 
TFEU92 to the Regulation) for the exclusion of judiciary deeds (‘pleadings’) from the freedom 
of access. The CJEU specifies that its documents are rightly excluded from the Regulation 
‘while those proceedings remain pending’.93  
Moreover, Government submissions are not documents produced by the parties of the 
judicial controversy. They are mere legal opinions on points of law raised before the Court by 
the referring national court. One may wonder whether they could not be considered as the 
“third party documents” mentioned by Article 9 of the above-mentioned Court Decision. 
According to this article, when the Court is required to disclose documents received by a 
third party (which can include a Member State) it will have to consult said third party before 
granting access to the applicant.94 
Many CJEU commentators and practitioners have called for reform of the Statutes regulating 
the Court towards greater transparency.95  Some argue that the very case law of the Court in 
                                                                 
90 See joined cases C-528/07 P and C-532/07 P Sweden and Others v API and Commission [2010] ECR I-8533 para 93, where 
the CJEU s tates  ‘exposing judicial activities to external pressure, albeit only in the perception of the public, and would 
dis turb the serenity of the proceedings’. It needs to be specified that the case at hand regards a  disclosure of Commission’s 
documents under Reg1049/02 not access to Governments written observation 
91 Ibid, para 87 ‘In addition, such a  situation could well upset the vital balance between the parties to a dispute before those 
Courts  – the s tate of balance which is at the basis of the principle of equality of arms – s ince only the institution concerned 
by an application for access to i ts documents, and not all the parties to the proceedings, would be bound by the obligation 
of disclosure.’ In this ruling however the Court considers the disclosure of submissions from the EU commission; it argues 
that the principle would be trumped because only one party (the Commission) would be bound to disclosure, and not the 
others . We however required the disclosure of all submissions, hence respecting the principle of ‘equality of arms’. 
Contrast AG Madura’s Opinion (at 37), arguing that “once a final judgment has been delivered, the parties’ submissions 
should be available to the public unless exceptional reasons demand that secrecy be maintained in a  particular case. 
However, such reasons cannot be presumed to exist in a ll cases. Given the weighty reasons militating in favour of making 
this  information public, such exceptions should be limited.” 
92 Article 255 EC. 
93 Ibid, para 94 ‘It i s therefore appropriate to allow a  general presumption that disclosure of the plead ings lodged by one of 
the institutions in court proceedings would undermine the protection of those proceedings, for the purposes of the second 
indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001, while those proceedings remain pending.’ 
94 Art. 4.4 Regulation and Art. 9 Decision, quoted «Third party documents 1. The Court of Justice of the European Union 
sha ll not grant access to third party documents in i ts possession until it has received the consent of the third party 
concerned. 2. For the purposes of the present article, ‘third party’ shall mean any natural or legal person or body external 
to the Court of Justice of the European Union, including the Member States, the other institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies of the European Union and non-member States. 3. When the Court of Justice of the European Union receives an 
application for access to a  third party document, the competent authority shall consult the third party concerned in order 
to ascertain whether the third party opposes release of that document, unless i t decides of i ts own motion to refuse to 
release the document on the basis of one of the exceptions set out in Article 3”. 
95 As  an example of academic concerns, see Alberto Alemanno ‘Unpacking the Principle of Openness in EU Law: 
Transparency, Participation and Democracy, 39(1) European Law Review (2014) 72-90. As  an example of practitioners 
concerns, see generally the intervention of Michael Patchett-Joyce, Barrister at the Hearing on the Reform of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union, 24 Apri l 2013 Brussels, available at< 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201305/20130521ATT66428/20130521ATT66428EN.pdf> 
(accessed 20-8-18). Similar arguments have been made in the context of Trilogues under the EU legislative processes. See 
Curtin and Leino, “In search of transparency for EU law-making: trilogies on the cusp of dawn”, 54 Common Market Law 
Review (2017) 1673-1712.  
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terms of access to documents of the European Institutions calls for a revision of Regulation 
1049/200196. 
Among EU institutions, the Council of Europe is actively pursuing a policy of transparency for 
EU public institutions. For example, the Council issued an international convention that 
needs yet two ratifications in order to enter in force.97 Moreover, in a Recommendation on 
access to administrative documents, 98 the Council lists ten possible limitations to this right 
to access.99 One of these applies to our case: the equality of parties concerning court 
proceedings. This limitation, according to the guidance of the Council, would “allow a public 
authority to refuse access to its own documents so as not to weaken its position during 
proceedings to which it is a party”.100 Now, in our sample of preliminary references the 
Government is never a party. The intervention of a Government in our preliminary 
references, not featuring said Government as a party, can be assimilated to an amicus curie: 
a legal opinion from a third party.  Accessing these legal opinions, after the ruling has been 
issue, can hardly weaken the position of a party in that proceeding. 
Finally, these legal opinions from Governments, as this paper confirms, are strategically used 
by Member States to shape the legislation through jurisprudence. They could be compared 
in nature more to proposals in a legislative process than to pleadings in litigation between 
parties; and the European legislative process aims to be of the highest standard of 
transparency. 
 
                                                                 
96 See two notes by Prof. Henry Labayle requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs, ‘’L’accés du public aux documents de l’Union europèenne, ètat du droit à  l’instant de la rèvision du réglement 
1049/2001”, PE 393.287, 2008 and  “Les documents classifiés à la lumière du traité de Lisbonne”, PE 425.616, 2010. 
97 Counci l of Europe convention on access to public documents, available at < http://www.coe.int/fr/web/conventions/full-
l i st/-/conventions/treaty/205>.  The convention has been ratified by 8 countries. It will enter into force with 10 rati fications. 
98 Recommendation Rec(2002)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member s tates on Access to Official Documents (Adopted 
by the Committee of Ministers on 21 February 2002 at the 784th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies), available online at 
2http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cddh/Publications/DocAccess_Guide_en.pdf(accessed 29 August 2016). 
99 Ibid, at 27. Possible limitations are for: i . national security, defence and international relations; ii. public safety; i ii. the 
prevention, investigation and prosecution of criminal activities; iv. privacy and other legitimate private interests; v. 
commercial and other economic interests, be they private or public; vi . the equality of parties concerning court 
proceedings; vii. nature; vi ii. inspection, control and supervision by public authorities; i x. the economic, monetary and 
exchange rate policies of the state; x. the confidentiality of deliberations within or between public authorities during the 
internal preparation of a  matter. 
100 Ibid, at 15. 
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APPENDIX II: Written Observations, and the Rules of procedure of the 
CJEU 
 
In order to understand the function of the intervention of Governments by submitting 
written observations, and at what point in time they get to the attention of the Court, a few 
notes on the rules of procedure are helpful. 
The procedure of preliminary ruling is prompted by a reference from a national court of a 
Member State. The national court requires from the Court the interpretation of a point of 
European Law, which might indirectly involve the infringement of EU law from the Member 
State.101 The reference is lodged with the Registrar's Office, which deals with the translation 
of the full text of the reference into the EU official languages. The Registrar also defines the 
category within which the case should be classified (e.g. the legal subject-matter, as for 
example ‘social security' or ‘citizenship’ etc.).102 The case is then transferred to the President 
of the Court and to the First Advocate General. 
The President of the Court assigns the case to a chamber, and appoints a Reporting Judge 
within this chamber, whereas the First Advocate General assigns the case to an Advocate 
General. According to the procedural rules of the Court, no particular order, as for example a 
rotation order, is provided for the assignment of a case to a particular chamber. The only rule 
established by the procedure in terms of case assignment provides that particularly 
important cases can be entrusted to the Court in its formation as Grand Chamber.103 
The case assignment to the Reporting Judge and to the AG is made again without specific 
procedural rules (e.g. there is no rotation among Court Members). However, it is frequent 
that the same judges and the same AGs are responsible for cases relating to similar subject-
matter.104 Usually the AG to whom a case is assigned does not belong to the Member State 
involved in the litigation, or to the Member State of one of the parties in the case of a 
preliminary ruling.105 However, this unwritten rule is not always followed.106 
                                                                 
101 For di rect infringement a Breach proceedings is brought by the Commission against the allegedly infringing Member 
State. These procedures are out of the scope of this work. 
102 The i ssue of categorization i s not as trivial as it might seem. Defining a case as belonging to a  subject matter can 
determine for example whether Member State decide to intervene in the process (by making observations). See 
Bengoetxea, McCornick and Moral Soriano ‘Integration and Integrity in the Legal Reasoning of the European Court of 
Justice’ in G. De B`urca and J. H. H. Weiler (eds), The European Court of Justice (Oxford: OUP, 2001) 43 at 52. 
103 Article 60 Rules of Proceedings of the ECJ: ‘Assignment of cases to formations of the Court:  
 1. The Court shall assign to the Chambers of five and of three Judges any case brought before it in so far as the 
di fficulty or importance of the case or particular ci rcumstances are not such as to require that it should be assigned to the 
Grand Chamber, unless a Member State or an institution of the European Union participating in the proceedings has 
requested that the case be assigned to the Grand Chamber, pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 16 of the Statute.  
 2. The Court shall sit as a  full Court where cases are brought before i t pursuant to the provisions referred to in the 
fourth paragraph of Article 16 of the Statute. It may assign a case to the full Court where, in accordance with the fifth 
paragraph of Article 16 of the Statute, i t considers that the case is of exceptional importance.’ See the Rules of Procedure of 
the Court Of Justice, L 265/1 Official Journal of the European Union, 29.9.2012, ava ilable at <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:265:0001:0042:EN:PDF > 
104 Takis Tridimas, “The role of the Advocate General in the development of Community Law: some reflections” 34(6) 
Common Market Law Review (1997) 1349-1387, at 1355. See Noreen Burrows and Rosa Greaves, The Advocate General and 
EC Law (OUP 2007) at 23. 
105 Burrows  and Greaves, 2007, supra note 104 at 23. 
106 Tridimas, 2007, supra note 104 at 1356.  
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Once a case has been assigned, the ‘interested parties’ have two months, from the 
notification of the order from reference, to submit their written observations.  These 
‘interested parties’ are: a) the litigants before the national court, b) the Member States, c) 
the EU commission, EU Parliament, the Council, the European Central Bank, d) in some cases, 
the other EEA countries,107 the EFTA108 supervising authority or a non-member state which is 
party to an agreement providing its participation within determined subject-matters.109 
Written submissions of such statements of case, defences, and observations by the parties 
and by any intervener are received by the Registrar and circulated among the panellist judges 
and the AG. The submissions are accompanied, where possible, by the relevant documentary 
evidence.  
After the parties have filed their submissions, the Reporting Judge writes a preliminary 
report, to be presented at the Court general meeting,110 in which a summary of the case is 
made. The summary includes the main factual situation, the norms potentially applicable, 
previous referable case law, the questions referred by the national courts and the suggested 
answers of the parties and of the intervening Governments.111 The Reporting Judge might 
also indicate points of national law that need further clarifications or even details of the fact 
situation that would need further measures of inquiry. He or she can suggest to which 
formation of the Court the case should be assigned and whether to dispense with the 
hearing or the opinion of the AG.112 
After the conclusion of the written part, a date for the hearing, if a hearing has to be held, is 
fixed. At the hearing, the pleadings of the parties and any observation by interveners are 
heard by the panel of judges that forms the chamber. If a supplement of inquiry is necessary, 
also witnesses and experts are heard by the Court. In the procedure for preliminary ruling 
the parties do not have the chance to reply in writing to the introductory statements of their 
adversary, therefore they respond to their argument at the hearing.113   
After the parties have exposed their arguments, at a request of the president of the 
chamber, the Reporting Judge and the AG can ask for clarifications of the speakers. Finally, 
the Advocate General can issue his or her Opinion, but more often a date is announced for 
an opinion to be issued, around a month later.114 In the Opinion, the AG exposes thoroughly 
any doctrinal and jurisprudential arguments underpinning her proposed solution of the case. 
Alternative draft opinions can also be submitted by the AG to the Court, supporting different 
arguments.115 After the reading of the conclusions of the Opinion of the AG, the oral 
procedure is officially closed. However, the hearing can be reopened, after the submission of 
                                                                 
107 http://www.efta.int/eea 
108 http://www.efta.int 
109 See the Notes of the Guidance of Counsel i ssued by the Court, Section 9 (online at < 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2008-09/txt9_2008-09-25_17-37-52_275.pdf> accessed 20-08-
18) 
110 Article 59 of the Court Rules of Proceedings. The meeting is normally held on Tuesdays afternoon. See Burrows and 
Greaves, 2007, supra note 104 at 24. 
111  The Court Rules of procedure do not mandate the Judge Rapporteur to specifically provide an overview of all the 
wri tten observations. The Preliminary references that we have reviewed in the course of this study mentioned most, but 
not a l l written observations presented by the “interested parties”. 
112 According to Article 20 (formerly Art. 18) of the Statutes of the ECJ, as modified by the Nice treaty, ‘ [...]Where i t 
cons iders that the case ra ises no new point of law, the Court may decide, after hearing the Advocate General, that the case 
sha ll be determined without a  submission from the Advocate General’.  
113 Burrows  and Graves, 2007, supra FN 49 at 27. 
114 Ibid, at 27. 
115 Tridimas, 2007, supra note 104 at 1360. 
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the AG, if further measures of inquiry are required.116 
Before the deliberation, the Reporting Judge circulates a note to the other judges to suggest 
a draft ruling for the case. In this note she will state her agreement or disagreement with the 
opinion of the Advocate general. Any dissenting judge will normally circulate another note to 
express her views. If there is clear disagreement on a case within the Court, a meeting would 
be normally set to discuss the matter.117 Dissenting opinions of any member of the panel are 
not cited in the judgement. Normally, the Opinion of the AG is not cited in detail within the 
judgement either. If the ruling disagrees with the opinion of the AG, it elaborates its own 
legal reasoning. In alternative, when the judges agree with the Opinion, they refer to it in full 
or in part, often without restating the arguments expressed therein.118  
The AG, in her Opinion, analyses previous Court case law on the same issue and, if necessary, 
points out discrepancies and inconsistencies of the Court's previous legal reasoning. A 
comparative analysis of Member States legislation can also be included in the Opinion in 
order to support the arguments of the AG.119 Overall, the opinion of the Advocate General 
provides the most detailed and exhaustive analysis of the case, and it is often much more 
voluminous than the ruling. Interestingly, some Opinions offer an overview of the written 
observations submitted by the ‘interested parties’ before proceeding to analyse the case, 
some don’t. Even when they do, however, they do not necessarily cite all the written 
observations. Also the Preliminary Report from the Judge Rapporteur, which routinely 
displays an overview of the submissions before the Court, sometimes overlooks some 
written observations. It might be inferred that this is a preliminary indication of the relative 
impact that some submitting governments and EU institutions have on the jurisprudence of 
the Court. 
 
                                                                 
116 Ibid a t 28. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Tridimas, 2007, supra note 104 at 1360. 
 
 35 
APPENDIX III: Member States’ position on five key (‘recurrent’) 
copyright concepts 
 
This Appendix provides a fuller explanation of the data displayed in Section 6. It maps the 
legal route of the recurrent legal issues (delineating a normative void) before the Court.  
Communication to the public (Articles 3 InfoSoc Dir. and 8 Rental & Lending R Dir.) 
The legal concept of Communication to the public, according to our sample, was first 
addressed by the Court in EGEDA.120 The issue stemmed from the interpretation of Art. 2 of 
the Satellite Broadcasting Directive.121 Intervening Member States were in this case France, 
The United Kingdom, Germany and Spain. As customary, also the European Commission 
submitted written observations. All countries and the EU commission unanimously 
suggested to the court that retransmission of a broadcasting signal in hotel rooms was 
indeed communication to the public according to the cited article. Only Spain dissented and 
suggested a negative answer. The Court in this case accepted the suggestion of the majority.  
The second occurrence on communication to the public took place a few years later in 
SGAE.122 Although this case as well concerned the transmission of TV signals in hotel rooms, 
this time the interpretation of this concept was assessed in the light of Article 3 of the 
InfoSoc Directive. France, Ireland, Austria and Poland submitted observations. They all 
suggested unanimously that the mere installation of TV sets in hotel rooms did not amount 
to communication to the public. However, the actual emission of a TV signal was more 
controversial. While France, Poland and the EU Commission maintained that this indeed 
amount to a communication to the public, Austria and Ireland disagreed. The referring Court 
inquired about the possibility that this type of transmission is exempted by virtue of 
Copyright exceptions. Ireland was in favour of this construct, Austria disagreed. Eventually, 
the Court declared that the installation of TV sets in hotel room was not a communication to 
the public, but the actual retransmission of a TV signal needed the authorization of the right 
holder, and no copyright exception was applicable.  
Subsequent reference to communication to the public was made before the Court in 
FAPL/Murphy.123 This case examined a number of important copyright issues in addition to 
the communication to the public. Originality, Reproduction, Transient reproduction, and 
illicit devices were among the discussed concepts. On communication to the public in 
particular the question was whether broadcasting live football matches in pubs met the 
                                                                 
120 C-293/98 EGEDA ECLI:EU:C:2000:66. 
121 Counci l Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain rules concerning copyright and rights 
related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission. 
122 C-306/05 SGAE [2006] ECR I-11519. 
123 Joint cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Football Association Premier League and Others and C429/08 Murphy [2011] ECR I-
09083. 
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requirements to be considered a communication ex Art. 3 of the InfoSoc Directive. France, 
The United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, and Czech Republic submitted observations. The opinion of 
the Advocate General suggested a negative answer, along with Spain and the EU 
Commission. The other countries did not give a yes/no answer, except for France, which was 
for an affirmative answer. The Court agreed with the latter.  
Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace (BSA),124 another copyright-related case, examined the 
question of communication to the public, as a secondary issue.125 The question was whether 
a TV broadcasting of a graphic user interface was communication to the public ex Art. 3 
InfoSoc Directive. The answer of the Court was ‘No’, in agreement with the AG’s opinion. 
Czech Republic, Finland, and the EU Commission had suggested an affirmative answer. In 
Airfield,126 a Satellite broadcaster was ruled not to need the authorization of the right holder 
neither for the direct or the indirect retransmission of a broadcasting signal, since this did 
not reach a public. The norm in question was Article 2 of the Satellite Broadcasting 
Directive.127 Only Finland submitted observations and suggested the same interpretation of 
the Court, together with the AG, whereas the EU Commission suggested an affirmative 
answer.  
SCF128 was the following case, interestingly assessing communication to the public both from 
Article 3 of the InfoSoc directive and Article 8 of the Rental and Lending Rights Directive.129 
France, Greece, Ireland, and Italy submitted observations. The Advocate General suggested 
that while broadcasting of music in the waiting room was a communication to the public ex 
Article 8 of the Rental and Lending Right Directive, was not so ex Article 3 of the InfoSoc 
Directive. The EU Commission, Ireland, and Italy were against a communication to the public 
in the case at hand, both ex Article 3 and Article 8, whereas France was in favour, on the 
basis of both directives. The Court eventually agreed with the majority.  
In Phonographic Performance,130 the issue of broadcasting in hotel rooms was again 
examined, this time in the light of Article 8 of the Rental and Lending Right Directive. A 
positive answer would have determined that the hotel has to pay equitable remuneration to 
the rightholder. The referring court also asked whether a hotel could be considered a user, 
thus benefiting from the exception for private use ex Article 5(2) of the InfoSoc Directive. 
France, Greece, and Ireland submitted observations. The ruling was in favour of this being a 
communication to the public, in accordance with France and the EU Commission, and in 
disagreement with Greece and Ireland. Moreover, according to the AG and France, although 
the hotel can be considered a user, it cannot be exempted by Article 5(2) of the InfoSoc 
                                                                 
124 C-393/09 - Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace [2007] ECR I- 4887. 
125 The main issue was whether a graphic user interface was protected by the software directive. The court replied “no”, but 
declared that the GUI was protected by the Infosoc directive. The issue of Originality was discussed. 
126 C-431/09 - Airfield and Canal Digitaal [2012] ECDR 3. 
127 Above note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
128 C-135/10 SCF ECLI:EU:C:2012:140. 
129 Di rective 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on rental right and lending 
right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property. 
130 C-162/10 Phonographic Performance (Ireland) ECLI:EU:C:2012:141. 
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Directive. Ireland, Greece and the EU Commission disagreed. According to the Commission’s 
observations it is up to Member States to decide whether a hotel can be exempted from 
paying equitable remuneration. The AG suggested that the hotel is not a user, but if the 
Court should decide differently, Member States are free to decide whether to exempt them 
ex Article 5(2) InfoSoc Directive. Eventually the ruling agreed with France on each point.  
In Circus Globul Bucaresti,131 a decision had to be made on whether communication to the 
public was possible when the public is present. Romania and Spain submitted observations. 
There was no Opinion of the AG. The Court responded negatively, in disagreement from 
Spain. In ITV broadcasting132 there was a question on whether communication to the public 
ex Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive included terrestrial TV broadcast, and whether factors 
such as activity for profit and direct competition with the original broadcaster were relevant. 
The UK, France, Italy, Poland, and Portugal submitted observations. The ruling responded 
affirmatively to the question, in agreement with all submitted observations, and negatively 
to the relevance of the two factors, as suggested by France and Portugal, in disagreement 
with Italy and the UK. Poland and the EU commission finally were split of the relevance of 
the two factors. In OSA133 the issue of communication to the public ex Article 3 of the 
InfoSoc Directive was transferred from hotels to spa premises, with the same result. The 
ruling was in favour of a communication to the public, as was the AG, the EU Commission 
and Czech Republic. Also Germany, Austria, and Hungary had submitted observations, but 
their position is not known or clear.  
Svensson134 was one of the most hotly debated cases in copyright literature. It discussed 
hyperlinking as a communication to the public ex Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive. There 
was no Opinion; and France, Italy, and the UK submitted observations. France suggested an 
affirmative answer, whereas the Court eventually ruled in the negative, in agreement with 
the UK and the EU Commission. To be exact, the Court ruled that hyperlinking was not 
communication to the public if the linked website was freely accessible, because in this case 
there was no new public. The decision was controversial because hyperlinking was 
considered in principle capable of making a communication, although there was no 
transmission of the content.135 In C More Entertainment,136 there was a question of 
extending the rights of broadcasting organizations to sport fixtures live on the internet, and 
the answer of the Court was ‘no’, against the opinion of Finland and the EU Commission. 
There was no Opinion of the AG. In UPC Telekabel137 it was asked whether the ISP of the 
person accessing a work infringing Article 3(2) of the InfoSoc Directive can be regarded as an 
                                                                 
131 C-283/10 Circus Globul Bucaresti ECLI:EU:C:2011:772. 
132 C-607/11 ITV broadcasting[2013] ECR I-0000. 
133 C- 351/12 OSA ECLI:EU:C:2014:110. 
134 Case C-466/12 Svensson ECLI:EU:C:2014:76. 
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136 C-297/13 C More Entertainment ECLI:EU:C:2014:331. 
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intermediary (as per Article 8 InfoSoc Directive) whose services are being ‘used’ by the 
copyright infringer. The Court answer was affirmative, in unanimous agreement with all 
submitting governments (Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, the UK, and Ireland) and the 
Opinion.  
In SBS Belgium138 the Court ruled that point-to-point broadcasting, without the involvement 
of the public, was not a communication to the public, in the absence of an Opinion and in 
contrast to France, Poland and the EU Commission. More recently, in Reha Training,139 the 
communication to the public was again examined both from the InfoSoc Directive and the 
Rental and Lending rights Directive. This time the broadcasting of content had taken place in 
a rehabilitation centre. The Court was required to clarify whether the interpretation of 
communication to the public ex Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive and Article 8 of the Rental 
and Lending rights Directive had to be made according to the same criteria. The answer was 
‘yes’ to all the questions, in agreement with France, Germany and the EU Commission.  
Finally, in GS Media, hyperlinking to unauthorised content was discussed, and it was 
concluded that this was indeed a communication to the public. More in detail, the Court 
ruled that hyperlinking to an infringing website is a communication to the public, unless the 
content has previously been made available with the consent of the right holder. Awareness 
of the lack of right holder’s consent, which is presumed in the case of for profit activity, is 
relevant. In contrast, the opinion of the AG had suggested a negative answer to the main 
question, and also that all suggested factors were not relevant, in agreement with Germany, 
Portugal and the EU Commission. For France, the consent of the right holder was not 
relevant whereas a key factor is the easiness to find the website. According to the 
observations of France, there is communication to the public if the link acts as a facilitator. 
Slovakia generally agreed with the others, except on the knowledge of the lack of 
authorization, which they deemed relevant. In this ruling, in essence the Court did not seem 
to accept most of the suggested answers. 
Fair compensation (Articles 5(2) InfoSoc Dir.) 
The first case on fair compensation stemming from the exception to exclusive rights 
introduced by Article 5 (2) of the InfoSoc Directive was Padawan.140 The ruling made clear: a) 
that Member states are not free to choose the system they prefer in the matter of fair 
compensation; b) that a fair balance of rights has to be respected when calculating fair 
compensation ex Article 5(2) InfoSoc Directive; c) that the levy must have a connection with 
the presumed use of the device; d) and that levies cannot be applied to professional use, 
because in this case no ‘private’ copy is possible. As a consequence, the Spanish legislation 
on this matter was declared incompatible with the InfoSoc Directive. Several countries and 
Collective Management Organizations (CMOs) submitted written observations to this case.   
                                                                 
138 C-325/14 SBS Belgium ECLI:EU:C:2015:764. 
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The Opinion aligned with the ruling, on all points. On the freedom to decide by Member 
States, the observations of the UK, Germany, and Finland were in line with the Opinion, as 
well as the EU Commission and the CMOs EGEDA and AIE. Spain, France and Greece were 
instead in favour of self-determination of national governments, as well as the CMOs CEDRO 
and AGEDI. On the fair balance of rights that has to be taken into account when calculating 
fair compensation the position of Greece, the UK, EGEDA, and AGEDI aligned with the 
Opinion; whereas France, Spain, Germany and CEDRO differed. On the matter of the 
connection between the levy and the presumed use of the device France, the UK, and AGEDI 
agreed with the Opinion, whereas Spain, Greece, Finland, CEDRO, and EGEDA disagreed. The 
Opinion also stated that levies cannot be imposed on professionals, because in that case 
there is no private copy, followed by France, the UK, and Germany. On the opposite position 
were Spain, Greece, the EU Commission, and all the CMOs. Finally, the legislation of Spain 
was considered incompatible with the InfoSoc Directive in the Opinion, against the 
observations of France, Spain, and most CMOs. 
The second case on fair compensation in our sample is Stichting de Thuiskopie.141 It was a 
question of whether distant sellers have to pay levies and the ruling confirmed that this was 
the case, in agreement with the Opinion and with Spain, Lithuania, Austria, and Finland, and 
in disagreement with Belgium and the EU Commission. In WG Wort142 the Court ruled that 
the InfoSoc Directive does not apply before its entry into force; that levies can be paid by an 
intermediary manufacturer in the case of linked devices; and that the possibility to 
implement technological protection measures (TPM) on the protected content and the 
authorization of the right holder are irrelevant for the applicability of the levies. To the 
prodromal applicability of the Directive the observations and the Opinion were unanimous 
to say that it had to be excluded, except for Spain. According to the observations of Czech 
Republic, Austria, and the UK levies can be paid by intermediaries, whereas all the others 
disagreed. Finally, the possible implementation of TPM and the authorization of the right 
holder are irrelevant for Germany, Poland and the EU Commission, relevant for most of the 
others. 
The ruling in Amazon.com143 decided that equitable remuneration can be levied only 
through a CMO. This levy applies also to intermediaries, but national law can a priori allow 
for exceptions to payment. However, equitable remuneration applies only to recording 
media sold to natural persons; and it can be paid either in direct or indirect form. Finally, the 
CMO can require a payment in a Member State also if a levy has already been paid in 
another Member State. Austria, France, Portugal and Finland submitted observations. The 
Opinion was followed point by point by the ruling, as was largely the submission of the EU 
commission.  France and Finland broadly agreed, except on the point that the levy can be 
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applied only on a recording media sold to a natural person. The submission of Portugal did 
not take a yes/no position on the matter. 
Copydan Båndkopi144 further elaborated the questions of VG Wort by asking whether the 
authorization of the right holder and the implementation of TPMs (the actual 
implementation, not only ‘possible’ as in VG Wort) could be a consideration when deciding 
on the applicability of levies. In addition, Copydan also included the harm to right holder, as 
a further consideration. The referring court also asked about the application of levies to 
multifunction equipment, such as mobile phones and the collection from producers and 
importers, if the cost can be passed onto the final user. The Court confirmed that the 
authorization of the right holder and the implementation of TPMs is irrelevant, but not the 
harm to the owner. Levies can be applied to mobile phones and can be collected from 
producers and importers. The Opinion agreed with the ruling on the lack of relevance of 
TPMs and the authorization of the right holder, but disagreed with the relevance of the harm 
for the owner and the levies on mobile phones. As for the governments’ submissions, 
France, the Netherlands, the UK, and the EU Commission were for the relevance of the 
authorization of the right holder while Finland disagreed. On the relevance of TPMs, France, 
Finland and the EU Commission were in favour, while the Netherlands was against, and the 
UK di not express a yes/no position. On the possibility of levying also when harm to right 
holder is minimal, they all agree that this was possible, and also on levies on mobile phones 
and on producers and importers. 
In ACI Adams,145 the important question of whether to implement levies to compensate 
right owners against unlawful copies was raised, and the answer was negative. A small 
number of corollary questions were also posed by the referring court. The Court did not 
answer to whether the three steps test could expand copyright exceptions, and most written 
observations din not address this point; except for Spain, which suggested a negative 
answer. The CJEU ruled that levies are not payable to compensate for unlawful private copy 
and they cannot be paid regardless of the presence or the absence of rightholders’ 
authorization. This position was shared entirely by the Opinion, Spain, Italy, Lithuania, and 
the EU Commission, whereas Austria and the Netherlands differed. Everybody agreed 
(except for the plaintiff) that the Enforcement Directive is not applicable to levies. 
Other details on the interpretation and definition of the boundaries of fair compensation for 
private copy were discussed in HP Belgium.146 A few governments submitted observations: 
Belgium, Czech Republic, Ireland, Austria, Poland, Portugal, and Finland. Here the Court 
ruled that fair compensation is different for any user and for a private user without 
commercial ends, in agreement with Ireland, Portugal and the EU Commission, and in 
disagreement with Belgium, Austria and Poland. The stance of Czech Republic and Finland 
was not a yes/no answer. The Court ruled also that levies cannot consist of a lump sum and a 
                                                                 
144 C-463/12 - Copydan Båndkopi ECLI:EU:C:2015:144. 
145 C-435/12 ACI Adam ECLI:EU:C:2014:254. 
146 C-572/13 Hewlett-Packard Belgium ECLI:EU:C:2015:750. 
 41 
proportional payment as well, in agreement with Ireland, Portugal and the EU commission, 
and in disagreement with Belgium, Austria and Poland. Finally, the Court ruled that fair 
compensation cannot be shared between the author and the publisher;147 and that there 
cannot be levies for reprography of sheet music, in agreement with Portugal, Finland and the 
EU Commission. The Opinion agreed with the ruling except for the sharing of fair 
compensation with publishers.  
Finally, in EGEDA (2014),148 there was a discussion on whether fair compensation for private 
copy can be financed with the General State Budget, and be determined without taking into 
account the harm to the owner. Spain, Greece, France, Finland, and Norway submitted 
observations along with a substantial number of collective management organizations 
(EGEDA, Dama, AISGE, CEDRO, AGEDI, AIE, and SGAE). The Opinion disagreed with the Ruling 
and stated that fair compensation can be financed by the general state budget. In line with 
the Opinion were Spain, Finland, Norway, and the EU Commission. Greece, France, and all 
the CMOs strongly disagreed. Also the Opinion, France, Finland, and all the CMOs declared 
that Article 5(2) of the InfoSoc Directive precludes a determination of fair compensation 
within budgetary limits without taking into account the harm to the right holder. Only Spain 
and the defendant (Ametic) responded negatively. The ruling did not address this point.  
Distribution Rights (Article 4 InfoSoc Directive) 
On the Distribution Rights, the first case of Copyright ECJ Jurisprudence was Laserdisken.149 
Here, essentially, the Court was asked whether Article 4 of the InfoSoc Directive precluded 
International exhaustion in EU Member States. This implies that once a copyright work has 
been lawfully put into commerce in a non-EU country, it can lawfully be imported and sold 
within the EU without the consent of the right holder. Poland was the only Government to 
submit observations. On the other hand, not only the EU Commission but also the EU 
Parliament and the Council of Europe submitted written observations. All the parties and 
intervening institutions agreed that international exhaustion does not apply in Europe, 
against the pleadings of the plaintiff and the written observations of Poland. 
Peek & Cloppenburg150 was the following case in which the Court was asked to establish 
whether a work can be considered as distributed ex Article 4 InfoSoc Directive when: a) it is 
made temporarily available to third parties; b) it is displayed in a shop window; c) and 
although the work is not copyright-protected in its country of manufacture. Again, only 
Poland submitted observations, in favour of the application of Article 4; but the Court, in 
agreement with the AG and the EU Commission, ruled differently. 
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In Donner, there was a discussion on was whether distribution right ex Article 4 is infringed 
when the work is purchased in a country where it is not copyright-protected, and the answer 
of the Court was affirmative, in agreement with the AG, the EU Commission, and the Czech 
Republic (the only country that had submitted observations). 
In Blomquist,151, the referring court asked whether distribution rights applied although the 
product is sold on a non-EU website and the answer was affirmative, in agreement with 
France, Poland and the EU Commission. There was no AG Opinion and also Estonia 
submitted observations, but its position is not known. In Dimensione Direct Sales,152 offering 
a work for sale (as opposed to selling) was deemed to infringe distribution rights in 
agreement with the AG, the EU Commission, and the only intervening country: Spain. Finally, 
in Art and Allposters153 the relevance of changing medium was discussed with relation to 
distribution rights, and it was ruled that indeed changing support stops the distribution right, 
in agreement with the AG and France, and in disagreement with the UK. 
Apart from the obvious case of displaying a work in a shop window, the distribution right ex  
Copyright Exceptions (Article 5 InfoSoc Directive) 
The first case on copyright exceptions that appears in our sample is Infopaq.154 This case is 
extremely complex: it revolves around the concept of transient reproduction, the only 
mandatory exception of the InfoSoc Directive, provided by Article 5(1). The 13-questions 
preliminary reference aims at clarifying the multiple facets of this exception. The suggested 
answers from the AG, the EU Commission and from Austria (the only country submitting 
observations) differ in their nuances, but overall they concur on the interpretation of this 
exception in a narrow sense, by not allowing the facts of the case in question to fall under 
the exception for transient reproduction.  
In Painer,155 essentially the referring court asked the CJEU whether newspapers can invoke 
the exception for public security although their help was not specifically required by the 
authorities, and the answer was negative. Austria, Spain, and Italy submitted observations, 
along with the EU Commission, and overall their suggested answers were accepted by the 
Court. The only exception relates to the need for an official order of the authorities, which 
was acknowledged by the Court and Spain, but deemed unnecessary by Austria and the EU 
commission. In DR and TV2 Denmark,156 the exception for broadcasting organizations ex 
Article 5(d) of the InfoSoc Directive was examined. In particular, the definition of “own 
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facilities” was discussed.157 The exception was interpreted in a broad sense, by including 
among “own facilities” also the facilities of third parties acting on behalf of the broadcaster. 
This was in line with the AG’s opinion and in disarray with the only submitting country, 
Spain. 
In Deckmyn,158 the concept of the copyright exception for parody was simplified by the 
court, which required for the definition of this concepts less restraints compared to some 
national legislation, with the full accord of the AG and the only submitting country, Belgium. 
In Meltwater, 159  the national court essentially asked whether on screen website copies met 
the requirements for Article 5(1) of the InfoSoc Directive, and the answer was affirmative, in 
agreement with the UK, Poland, and the EU commission. Finally, in Technische Universität 
Darmstadt160 the question of dedicated terminals in public libraries, normally protected by 
the exception for libraries ex Article 5(c) InfoSoc Directive,161 was discussed. In particular, 
the possibility for library patrons to print out or save on USB memory supports the library 
material was questioned; and received by the Court a negative answer. On the possibility of 
printing, the submitting member states (Germany, Italy, Poland, and Finland) disagreed. 
Germany and the EU Commission were against, whereas Italy and Finland were in favour. All 
submissions agreed on the impossibility of saving the documents on USB memory stick. 
Responsibility of Intermediaries (Article 8 Enforcement Directive) 
Promusicae162 was the first case discussing the responsibility of intermediaries with relation 
to online copyright infringement. The CJEU was asked whether the e-commerce directive, 
the InfoSoc Directive and the Enforcement Directive163 require an obligation for the provider 
to communicate personal data of users in order to identify copyright infringements in civil 
proceedings, and the answer was ‘no’. Slovenia and the UK were against, in line with the 
ruling, with the AG and the Commission, while Italy and Finland were in favour. 
First, automatic filtering device were scrutinised by the Court in Scarlet,164 where the only 
permissive positions were held by the rightholders and the intervening collecting societies 
(BEA Video, BEA Music, ISPA), whereas the unanimous opinion of the AG, the EU 
Commission and the submitting countries (Belgium, Czech Republic, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Poland, and Finland) was against. Subsequently, in Bonnier, the Court had to rule on whether 
data protection directives preclude asking information on users ex Article 8 of the 
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Enforcement Directive in order to identify copyright infringers in civil proceedings, and the 
answer was ‘no’, in line with the Opinion, the EU Commission and all submitting countries 
(Sweden, Czech Republic, Italy, and Latvia).  
Pre-emptive filtering devices implemented by providers were again considered inadmissible 
by the Court with the unanimous agreement of all submitting countries and against the sole 
opinion of the EU Commission in SABAM.165 Interestingly, in UPC Telekabel166 mandating 
ISPs to prevent their customers from accessing pirate web sites was declared inadmissible by 
the Court, against the unanimous opinion of the AG, the EU commission, and all the 
submitting countries (Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, the UK and Ireland). However, very 
recently in Mc Fadden167 an injunction against internet service providers to monitor users’ 
identity or to restrict access in order to prevent anonymity was considered not incompatible 
with article 12 of the E-Commerce directive. Poland was the only government to submit 
written observations and it aligned with the ruling of the Court. 
The position of the Court on the Responsibility of the Intermediaries is consistently in favour 
of the balance of rights (in particular, the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection) 
even when the rest of the players are against. The intervening Member States instead agree 
that preventive indiscriminate filtering devices go too far vis-à-vis these fundamental rights, 
but they are favourable to specific measures to counteract infringement, once an 
infringement has been detected. 
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